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Kramer: "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular Constitutional

Lectures
“THE INTEREST OF THE MAN”: JAMES
MADISON, POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM,
AND THE THEORY OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY
Larry D. Kramer*
In 2004, I published a book titled The People Themselves that recounted
the origins and early history of judicial review.1 It had several objectives,
some historical, others normative. From a historical perspective, my chief
aim was to question and hopefully to dispel certain myths about the
Founding. In particular, I wanted to counter the idea that our Constitution
was, first and foremost, an instrument of reaction designed to blunt
democratic politics by channeling authority to an elite removed as far as
possible from popular control. This widely held belief caricatures a more
complicated story that is also more democratic in its overtones. Along the
way, I hoped to raise some questions about our willingness today to cede
control over the Constitution to the judiciary, a development more recent
than most people believe and one that derives considerable support from
this misreading of our history.
Today, we have for all practical purposes turned the Constitution over
to the Supreme Court. We take for granted that final interpretive authority
rests with the Justices. Yes, the other branches and departments have a role.
Yes, they must interpret the Constitution in deciding what they can and
cannot do (which they then indicate by acting or declining to act on
constitutional grounds or for constitutional reasons). But when disputes
arise, we—and by “we” I mean not just members of the legal profession, but
political leaders and the American public as well—assume that the Supreme
Court is responsible for their final resolution. It is the Court that tells us
what the Constitution means. This, in a nutshell, is the principle of judicial
supremacy.

Richard E. Lang Professor and Dean, Stanford Law School. I am grateful for comments by
Josh Cohen, John Ferejohn, Barry Friedman, Tom Grey, Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, David
Luban, Josh Ober, Robert Post, Jack Rakove, Colleen Sheehan, Mark Tushnet, Gordon Wood,
and participants at the Legal Theory Workshop and the Political Theory Workshop at Stanford
University.
1
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES].
*
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We can still disagree with the Court. No one takes supremacy to mean
that once the Justices have spoken everyone must submissively lower their
gaze and slink home. We can, if we choose, shriek our heads off in protest
of Supreme Court rulings. But our options for changing those rulings, for
establishing a different interpretation, are said to be limited to amending
the text (that is, making new constitutional law),2 importuning the Justices
to chart a different course, and waiting for one or more of them to die or tire
of the job so we can (hopefully) appoint new Justices with views more to
our liking.3 Anything else, we are told, is unlawful and unconstitutional.
The court-packing, jurisdiction-stripping, budget-cutting, judgmentignoring actions of such rascally presidents as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and both Roosevelts were a betrayal of judicial
independence: a threat to the very foundations of constitutional order that
must never be repeated.
The modern constitutional system thus draws a distinction between
interpreting an existing Constitution and making new constitutional law
and does its best to confine popular control to the latter, nearly impossible
task. The community at large has no formal authority to interpret. On the
contrary, resisting popular views about the meaning of the Constitution is
considered a judicial virtue, which is why battles over new Supreme Court
appointments have grown so fierce in recent years. The stakes are indeed
high once we accept that the Justices have the power to decide for us what
the Constitution means, and that their decisions determine, finally, what
constitutional law “is.”

2
For this purpose, I do not care whether new constitutional law must be made exclusively
through Article V or whether the process includes extra-textual means as well. See BRUCE
ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Whether
the Constitution can be amended outside Article V has always struck me as, if not quite
irrelevant, insignificant compared to the more important question of interpretive authority. It
becomes a matter of consequence only once the power to interpret has been removed from
popular control and lodged in courts.
3
Consider in this regard the recent legislation banning abortions enacted in South Dakota.
See South Dakota Women’s Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 2006 Sess. (S.D.
2006). In enacting a statute blatantly at odds not just with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), but also with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), South Dakota’s legislators
were not claiming authority to ignore the Court. They did not assert co-equal authority to say
what the Constitution means and adopt legislation in the belief that they were not bound by
the Court’s different interpretation. Quite the opposite: they accepted judicial supremacy and
were submitting themselves to the Court’s superior authority. They enacted this legislation
because they believe they do not have power to ignore the Court and want it to say whether
Roe is still good law now that two new Justices are on the bench. They chose this route, in
other words, precisely because they accept the Court’s word as final on the matter.
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Constitutionalism in the Founding era was different. Then, power to
interpret (and not just the power to make) constitutional law was thought to
reside with the people. And not theoretically or in the abstract, but in an
active, ongoing sense. It was the community at large—not the judiciary, not
any branch of the government—that controlled the meaning of the
Constitution and was responsible for ensuring its proper implementation in
the day-to-day process of governing. This is the notion I labeled “popular
constitutionalism”—to distinguish it from “legal constitutionalism” or the
idea that constitutional interpretation has been turned over to the judiciary
and, in particular, to the Supreme Court.
***
I should take a moment to clarify the way in which popular
constitutionalism is not mere politics, but is in fact a legal concept that treats
the Constitution as “law” in its proper sense. Both in daily parlance and as
a technical matter, we draw a line between law and politics and see them as
distinct categories. Twentieth-century legal scholarship may have made
this line fuzzy, but we still think of law as different from politics in at least
two important respects.
First, where politics is viewed as a matter of free choice or will, law is
understood to contain an objective component that binds and limits. In
politics, a lawmaker is free to act as he or she thinks best. Law, in contrast,
is more constrained and constraining. Law interpreting, unlike legislating,
is not a matter of mere will or preference, but is to some extent formally
limited by the outcomes of politics. A law exists, and someone called upon
to interpret and apply the law is not as free as the lawmaker to do what he
or she wants. The law itself encumbers the field of available action.
Obviously, this description oversimplifies a complex relationship.
There are objective constraints in politics as well as in law (though different
kinds of constraints), and both law and politics involve the working out of
reasons for action (though different kinds of reasons). Nevertheless, the
basic distinction holds. There is, to be sure, disagreement about the extent
of the constraint created by law. No one today believes that interpretation
is a mechanical process without freedom of choice, but neither do we think
of reading and applying law as indistinguishable from politics. Precisely
where legal interpretation lies along the continuum between these extremes
remains an important question in jurisprudence. It is, however, a question I
have no interest in addressing here. For present purposes, what matters is
simply to recognize that the debate presupposes that applying law differs
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from doing politics because it includes constraints that do not exist in the
political domain.
A second ground on which law and politics are distinguished has to do
with the relevant actors. Where politics is a realm of legislatures and
executives and politically accountable officials, law is the realm of lawyers
and judges and courts. This is not a formal principle so much as a
customary, almost instinctual assumption. No one studies it or justifies or
refutes it; no one tries to define it with precision or to explain the many and
obvious exceptions. It is, rather, a postulate that is largely taken for
granted. Just defining the Constitution as “law” was thus a big part of the
reason we became comfortable assigning courts final interpretive authority
over its meaning.4
Popular constitutionalism is law-like in that it accepts the first of these
distinctions: that legal interpretation imposes constraints different from
those that exist in politics. The Constitution remains “law” in a system of
popular constitutionalism in that whoever is doing the interpreting is bound
by the Constitution’s legal content and must ascertain and enforce whatever
limits the text imposes on political action and political actors. Where
popular constitutionalism differs from present-day understandings is on the
second ground. It does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation
can take place only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally valid
process of interpretation can be undertaken in the political branches and by
the community at large. Anyone called upon to interpret the Constitution
can treat it as “law.” They may not always do so, but there is nothing
inherent in authoritative legal interpretation that requires it to be done by
members of the bar or bench.
Popular constitutionalism thus rests and relies on a political culture in
which public officials, community leaders, and ordinary citizens believe in
the distinction between law and politics, share a set of conventions about
how to argue within each domain, and take seriously the role difference it
produces. In a system of popular constitutionalism, participants respond to
different arguments in each setting and treat questions of constitutional
interpretation as “legal” problems that can be settled only by resort to the
“law” as understood through interpretive norms like text, history, and
precedent. Interests, desires, and beliefs about policy obviously matter, and
ordinary citizens think about constitutional meaning in their light. But so,
too, do lawyers and judges. Indeed, if anything, our professional training

Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV.
4, 8-10 (2001).
4
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has made us more skeptical than lay people about the extent to which the
law binds, albeit more adept at masking our cynicism in technical
argument.
***
So much is straightforward. People can differ about whether it is
realistic to think that ordinary citizens care about the Constitution as “law”
or are even capable of doing so, whether they have the commitment, the
intelligence, and the attention span to make popular constitutionalism
plausible. These are empirical propositions: not easily tested, but also not
hard to anticipate or argue about. I was prepared for this sort of challenge
when I wrote The People Themselves, at ease with my belief that lay people do
take the Constitution seriously, and comfortable arguing that, even if
lawyers and judges are in some sense “better” at constitutional
interpretation, that alone cannot justify anything so extreme as judicial
supremacy.
Does it not seem strange, after all, to celebrate a system for its
commitment to self government, meaning popular control of the
government and laws, and then to turn around and say that the most
important laws are just too important to be left to an ignorant mass? Jeremy
Waldron has noted, rightly I think, how deeply at odds this mistrust of the
capacity of ordinary citizens to think responsibly about rights is with the
assumptions we make about why they are entitled to those rights in the first
place (to wit, that human individuals are thinking agents “endowed with an
ability to deliberate morally, to see things from others’ points of view, and
to transcend a preoccupation with [their] own particular or sectional
interests”).5 Popular government is fine, it turns out, but only so long as
we’re not talking about anything too essential. Really foundational matters
should be left to a more dependable oligarch.6

JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 250 (1999).
Legal commentators and philosophers have been wonderfully adept at explaining how
giving judges the last word on constitutional meaning is not inconsistent with democracy,
which surely it is not, as a concept like “democracy” is capacious enough to include all sorts of
qualifications and limitations. The objection to judicial supremacy does not depend on arguing
that it cannot be reconciled with “democracy.” It rests, rather, on the idea that supremacy is
unnecessary: that it diminishes the scope of popular involvement for inadequate reasons. At
the end of the day, all the work done to justify judicial supremacy has no better or different
basis than mistrust of the larger community. It’s not about majority rule, but about which
majority rules; proponents of judicial supremacy simply trust a majority of nine more than they
trust a majority of the larger community, at least when it comes to this crucial subset of our
laws.
5
6
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That said, the claim that popular constitutionalism is a plausible
alternative cannot rest on a bare assertion that people take the Constitution
seriously (or seriously enough), even if they do. One still needs to explain
how constitutional disagreements are going to be resolved. We know how
judicial review works: parties have a dispute, one of them goes to court, we
have a trial, the case is decided and appealed, and eventually the Supreme
Court delivers an opinion. But what is the analogous process in a system of
popular constitutionalism? What does it mean to say that constitutional
controversies will be decided by the community at large? How does “the
community” do that? How is this even coherent?
That I failed adequately to explain how popular constitutionalism
works has probably been the most common criticism made of The People
Themselves. It surprised me at first, because I thought this was pretty clear
in the book. But when the point kept appearing, and not always from
reviewers hostile to the book’s sensibility and approach, I realized that the
theoretical dimensions of popular constitutionalism—how it fits our
political system and is meant to work—are embedded in the historical
narrative and so spread across the entire book. The theory was evident to
me because I had the whole picture in mind as I wrote. But it was not
similarly apparent to readers approaching my story for the first time, and,
in retrospect, it was a bit much to expect anyone to see the connection
between a paragraph in the first chapter, a passage in the fourth, an
argument in the epilogue, and so forth.
This Lecture is an effort to present the theory of popular
constitutionalism in a more straightforward manner. Doing so will not
resolve anyone’s empirical doubts or settle the comparative institutional
questions on which the acceptance or rejection of popular constitutionalism
must ultimately rest. But it should provide a better framework in which to
think about such matters.
***
That last paragraph is actually misleading insofar as it refers to “the”
theory of popular constitutionalism. For there is no one theory. Popular
constitutionalism, as such, is just a general concept or broad idea. As noted
above, basically it’s the idea that final authority to control the interpretation
and implementation of constitutional law resides at all times in the
community in an active sense. A “theory” of popular constitutionalism
involves showing how this idea works or could be made to work. But there
are countless institutional arrangements by which popular control can
become meaningful.
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The central narrative in The People Themselves is, in fact, a story about
how the practice of popular constitutionalism evolved over time so as to
preserve the idea and its realization despite constantly changing political,
legal, social, and cultural circumstances. Hence, the rowdy mobs of colonial
America gave way to “departmentalism” in the 1790s, which was then
supplemented by the creation of modern political parties in the 1830s. My
objective in charting these developments was to show how popular
constitutionalism, as a construct, could and did change, so that it need not
depend on the political conditions in which it first emerged, but could be
refined and updated to remain a viable part of American constitutionalism
and democracy.7
Nevertheless, among the many possible accounts of popular
constitutionalism that have been offered or could be imagined, there is one I
find attractive and will elaborate here. It is the version developed by James
Madison and articulated in essays he wrote as Publius and after. The most
profound political thinker of his generation, Madison conceptualized a
system of deliberative democracy, meant to apply equally to ordinary
politics and constitutional control, whose general contours, once properly
understood, seem to me as potentially relevant today as they were in his
own time.

7
Given this narrative, reading The People Themselves (as some critics did, see Saikrishna
Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1564 (2005) (book
review)) to equate popular constitutionalism with eighteenth-century mobbing seems
particularly thoughtless. The whole thrust of the book was to show how, even as American
politics and society changed, and even as “the people” expanded to include poor white men
and blacks and women, the basic commitment to popular control of the Constitution could be
and was self-consciously preserved.
I recounted this history in detail through approximately 1840. I then passed quickly over
the subsequent 165 years in a single chapter of thirty pages. This led to another frequent
criticism: that one cannot assume popular constitutionalism might be relevant today without a
similarly detailed treatment of the intervening years, which may have brought about its demise
and disappearance. I ended the detailed history where I did because my expertise was
exhausted and because a similar treatment of the rest of American history would have taken
another 800 pages. Rather than do that, I simply touched on a few highlights to suggest how,
contrary to conventional wisdom, the idea of popular constitutionalism did not fade from
view, but remained vibrant and arguably dominant in American political culture until at least
the middle of the twentieth century. My hope was that other legal historians might find the
story interesting enough to carry it forward into later periods. And a number of scholars have
begun to do just that. See, e.g., A Symposium on The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809-1182 (2006). Even more
gratifying, most have said it would be a mistake to treat the Founding as a golden age of
popular constitutionalism. The real peak, they say, came later, in their period, be it abolition or
Reconstruction or the Progressive or New Deal eras. Sorting all this out will take time.
Clearly, popular constitutionalism remained alive; just as clearly, it continued to evolve. There
are important and interesting stories still to be told.
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Note the qualification “once properly understood.” There is, at present,
a particular understanding of Madison that dominates American
constitutional thought.8 According to this view, Madison was frightened of
popular politics and deeply suspicious of majority rule, which he had come
to believe threatened to ruin the new nation. Having witnessed politics in
the states during the critical years just after the Revolution, more, having
experienced state government first hand during an exasperating three-year
stint in the Virginia Assembly, Madison had come to see democracy as the
problem, particularly as it was practiced in the popularly-elected state
legislatures. Yet rather than give in to despair, as some of his
contemporaries were wont to do, Madison set out to find an answer. And
he succeeded brilliantly, shepherding in a new national Constitution while
creating what Gordon Wood has called a fresh “American [s]cience of
[p]olitics.”9
The critical problem, as Madison saw it, was finding a way to choose
representatives capable of governing without succumbing to the corrupting
influences of faction, insularity, and lust for popularity or power. Thus, in
his most celebrated essay, Federalist 10, Madison famously explained how
size could do the trick. A large republic meant large election districts. The
sheer number of voters and variety of interests subsumed in such districts
would make getting elected impossible for candidates who had parochial
views or who were beholden to narrow interests. As broad support became
a practical necessity for office, elections would be “more likely to centre on
men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and
established characters.”10 Only the wisest, best educated, and most publicly
spirited would be picked to serve: “a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations.”11

8
One finds this reading, for example, in the introductory materials in leading constitutional
law casebooks. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12-26 (5th ed. 2005). The
same understanding is reflected in innumerable articles, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s
Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 612-14 & nn.2-21 (2001) (citing authorities), and in the writings
of our leading constitutional historians. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 35-56 (1996) [hereinafter RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS]; Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in
BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
69-93 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter eds., 1987) [hereinafter Wood,
Interests and Disinterestedness]. It pervades the political science literature.
9
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 593 (1969)
[hereinafter WOOD, CREATION] (emphasis omitted).
10
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
11
Id. at 62.
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Better still, enlarging the republic (and so taking in a greater variety of
interests) made it “less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their
own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”12 In other words, size
would also dilute faction, to such an extent that our wiser, justice-loving
representatives could use their superior wisdom relatively unencumbered
by the intense pressures that self-interested groups could bring to bear in
distorting government in a smaller society. The result: a deliberative
democracy in which elections are structured to sift out an elite that can then
deliberate on our behalf free from the irrationality, unreasonableness, and
self-interest that make popular politics such a hazard.13
Interestingly, Madison nowhere refers to the judiciary in this argument.
Indeed, none of Madison’s work during the critical years leading up to
Ratification paid much attention to courts. His letters and private writings
make clear that he thought the judicial department too weak to play a
meaningful role in constitutional enforcement, unless it was to lend a bit of
additional weight to the executive in a Council of Revision.14 But other than
a short passage in Federalist 39 (suggesting that the Supreme Court might
act as an impartial umpire in disputes between the national government
and the states),15 Madison as Publius had essentially nothing to say about
the third branch.
Still, the underlying premise of Madison’s theory, thus understood, is
eminently compatible with an idea like judicial supremacy. In politics, we
Id. at 64.
This by now conventional reading of Madison is most clearly stated and synthesized in
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
14
See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 JAMES MADISON,
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206, 211 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) [hereinafter
PAPERS OF MADISON] (“a State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would
not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of them”); James Madison, Madison’s
Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (1788), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 308, 315 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1952) [hereinafter Madison, Observations on Jefferson’s
Draft] (worrying about judicial review because “as the Courts are generally the last in making
their decisions, it results to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with
its final character. This makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the Legislature,
which was never intended and can never be proper.”); Notes of James Madison (June 6, 1787),
reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND] (comments of James Madison) (arguing for Council of
Revision rather than executive veto on grounds that the executive’s “firmness . . . wd. need
support”); Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in JAMES MADISON:
WRITINGS 39, 41-43 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinafter MADISON: WRITINGS] (approving a
Council of Revision and discussing the judiciary with no mention of judicial review).
15
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
12
13
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do our best to shift authority to an elite removed as far as possible from
direct popular control or influence. Is it not natural when it comes to the
Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, to do something similar and
even more dramatic? Judicial supremacy seems wholly agreeable with this
view of deliberative democracy, which is why so many defenders and
proponents of the Supreme Court’s authority have called on Madison for
support.16
***
But reading Madison this way misstates his thinking and misrepresents
his theory, which were more democratic than the received wisdom
understands. Not that faction and majority tyranny were not central
preoccupations in Madison’s mind. They were, and his anxiety about the
risks of popular government was real. Madison unquestionably saw certain
forms of democratic politics as noxious and unjust, and he believed it
possible to engineer the government’s internal structure to minimize these.
But structural innovations were mere “auxiliary precautions” to a more
basic and primary “dependence on the people.”17 Madison’s hope, his
whole purpose, was to make democratic politics work, not to minimize the
extent to which it interfered with a ruling elite. “In bestowing the eulogies
due to the partitions and internal checks of power,” he wrote, expressing
sentiments acted upon throughout his lifetime, “it ought not the less to be
remembered, that they are neither the sole nor the chief palladium [that is,
safeguard] of constitutional liberty. The people who are the authors of this
blessing, must also be its guardians.”18 Madison was, above all, a
committed republican who believed in popular government and believed
that the people must control the government and laws at all times:
someone for whom an idea like judicial supremacy was and could only be
anathema, a selling out of the very raison d’etre of the American Revolution
that was his life’s passion.19

16
See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703,
705, 711-12 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 115
(1986); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986);
Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 985 (1994).
17
Though “experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions,” Madison
wrote in Federalist 51, “[a] dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul on the
government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
18
James Madison, Government of the United States, NAT’L GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 1791, in 14 PAPERS
OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 217-18 [hereinafter Madison, Government].
19
To some extent, the prevailing misinterpretation of Madison comes from focusing so
obsessively on what he wrote between the calling of the Philadelphia Convention and the
successful conclusion of Ratification. Indeed, I toyed with titling this lecture “James Madison
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***
This is not the place to establish the coherence and consistency of
Madison’s actions and political philosophy over time. I do, however, need
to make two historical points as necessary background to understanding the
theory of deliberative democracy and popular constitutionalism he
articulated in The Federalist and fleshed out in essays published a few years
later.
First, we must put aside certain assumptions we tend to make,
consciously and unconsciously, when thinking about the Founding. Close
your eyes and picture Madison. Quick. Don’t think. Just picture the
person. Who do you see? An old man, I bet. Sober, solemn, a bit stern
looking: a “Founding Father.” But forget the “father” part, because these
grave old men did not found the United States. Our Founders, with a few
notable exceptions, were young men. Most were in their twenties and
thirties when the American Revolution began, still trying on identities and
deciding who they were or would be. And the Revolution gave them an

was Born Before 1786, and He Died After 1790,” because a very different Madison emerges if
we read what he said when the Constitution was composed against the background of his
whole political life. Madison’s entire career was dedicated to making republican government
work. He read and thought and wrote about it constantly. Yet most constitutional and
political theorists seem to know only the twenty-nine essays he penned as Publius (and not
even all of these), essays that were produced at a particular moment (albeit a very important
moment) to address a particular set of problems and exigencies (albeit important problems and
exigencies). Even writers who pay attention to Madison’s earlier and later writings seem
caught in Publius’s thrall. So dazzled are they by the conventional reading of The Federalist that
anything Madison wrote or said elsewhere that looks inconsistent is dismissed as driven by
politics (as if getting the Constitution adopted wasn’t political), or ignored on the ground that
Madison was (with apologies to Senator Kerry) a “flip-flopper” who changed positions when it
became expedient to do so. For an insightful, if ultimately unsuccessful, recent essay on the
question of Madison’s consistency, see GORDON S. WOOD, Is There a “James Madison Problem”?,
in REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 143, 154-65 (2006).
I believe this treatment very much misunderstands Madison, who was, as these things go,
quite consistent over the fifty plus years of his public life. Not that Madison’s thinking never
changed. Obviously his ideas evolved as he confronted new issues and circumstances and
learned that things did not always work as expected. Madison was indeed a “nationalist” in
the 1780s, a “state’s rights” supporter in the 1790s, and a nationalist again in the 1830s. But not
because he had abandoned principles or changed beliefs. Circumstances were different, the
problems were different, and unanticipated developments (such as the executive’s ability to
control the national political agenda) upended earlier assumptions. Like all really good
theorists, Madison adapted his ideas to what life and experience taught him. But his
fundamental commitments did not change, and his core ideas and beliefs remained consistent
over the years. If writers have missed this, it is partly because they have been asking the
wrong questions—looking at too particular a level of detail or focusing on outcomes rather
than reasoning. But the failure to comprehend Madison’s actions over time also results from
misunderstanding his theory more generally, a problem I hope to address here.
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answer. It shaped their lives and turned them into radicals and
revolutionaries in the fullest sense of the words.20
This was particularly true of Madison.21 Like many young men of
talent, he longed for something to give his life purpose, and he found that
something in the Revolution. Born in 1751, the eldest son of a wealthy
planter, Madison would in normal circumstances have been expected to
inherit and run the family estate. But the life of a well-to-do gentleman
farmer held little appeal for young James, and he made a break early by
choosing to attend the College of New Jersey (as Princeton was then called)
rather than follow Virginia’s other privileged sons to William and Mary.
Suddenly Madison found himself surrounded by brilliant young men from
throughout the colonies, discussing philosophy and religion and all the
important issues of the day. It was an exciting, cosmopolitan, intellectuallydiverse milieu unlike anything he had experienced back home in provincial
Virginia. Madison studied hard and excelled as a student, completing his
degree a year early. He also played hard: co-founding the American Whig
Society, writing ribald poetry, and thoroughly enjoying the idle
amusements that constituted college life in the mid-eighteenth century.
When he graduated in 1771, about the last thing James Madison wanted
was to return to what now seemed an unbearably dull life in Orange
County, Virginia. He wrote his father for permission to remain in Princeton
through the winter and perhaps to return again after a brief visit home the
following spring. Madison’s reasons for staying are not entirely clear,
though anyone whose life was changed by college can probably guess. In
his only surviving letter, Madison tells his father “I was so particular in my
last with regard to my determination about staying in Princeton this Winter
Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Founding Fathers: Young Men of the Revolution, 76 POL.
SCI. Q. 181, 203 (1961):
At the outbreak of the Revolution George Washington, at 44, was the
oldest of the lot [of those who later led the campaign to adopt the
Constitution]; six were under 35 and four were in their twenties. . . .
Nearly half of the Federalist group–Gouverneur Morris, Madison,
Hamilton, and Knox–quite literally saw their careers launched in the
Revolution. The remaining five–Washington, Jay, Duane, Wilson, and
Robert Morris–though established in public affairs beforehand, became
nationally known after 1776 and the wide public recognition which they
subsequently achieved came first and foremost through their
identification with the continental war effort.
21
The brief sketch that follows is drawn mainly from IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE
VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST 41-135 (1941), as updated and supplemented by RALPH KETCHUM,
JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 8-67 (1990), and JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1-21 (2d ed. 2002). See also Douglass Adair, James
Madison’s Autobiography, 2 WM. & MARY Q. 191 (1945).
20
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coming that I need say nothing more in this place, my sentiments being still
the same.”22 Madison’s biographers have assumed that he stayed because
he was ill, this based on a comment Madison scribbled some sixty years
Yet Madison’s
later in a short autobiographical summary.23
contemporaneous letter sounds less like someone pleading illness than like
a typical twenty-year-old college student who wants to stay with friends
and spend as little time at home as possible. Madison was notoriously frail,
of course, and he probably was ill. But he seems to have led an active social
life during his extra time at Princeton, and it is likely that any infirmity was
not particularly dire, though it did make a good excuse to give his family
for remaining in New Jersey.24
But not for long. Filial duty, not to mention lack of resources, forced a
reluctant Madison to return home in April, 1772. The two years that
followed were among the lowest of his life. Whatever disease or disability
afflicted Madison was at its worst during this period. Historians and
biographers have long puzzled over Madison’s illness, though I am inclined
(with Irving Brant) to see it as a “psychic trauma,” most likely some form of
depression.25 The physical symptoms were real, but triggered and
exacerbated by his emotional state. And Madison suffered greatly from the
time he returned to Montpelier until he found his vocation in revolutionary
politics several years later.
Whatever the source or nature of Madison’s illness, he clearly was
depressed being back home. And not solely because he was sick. He was
also bored, and lost. With his father still actively managing the plantation,
Madison’s chief responsibility became tutoring his younger siblings, a
dispiriting comedown from the joys of studying and conversing with
teachers and friends at college. Worse than bored, Madison felt boring:
exiled to a place where nothing interesting happened or would happen. “I
am sorry my situation affords me nothing New Curious or entertaining to
Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Oct. 9, 1771), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 68-69.
23
See Adair, supra note 21, at 197. “His health being at the time too infirm for a journey
home, he passed the ensuing winter in Princeton . . . .” Id.
24
As Madison’s leading biographer, Irving Brant, notes:
[I]t appears that Madison had been well enough in the past summer to
wish for the use of a new coat. Two weeks before writing, he had moved
among the commencement visitors and planned to go to see one of them
elsewhere in New Jersey. Though unable to go home, he nonchalantly
asked for money with which to buy a horse in the spring and shows
plainly that he wants it to carry him not only from Princeton to
Montpelier, but back again for another summer of study.
BRANT, supra note 21, at 99.
25
Id. at 106-07.
22
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pay you for your agreeable information & remarks,” he wrote his classmate
and close friend William Bradford, who now lived in Philadelphia. “You
being at the Fountain-Head of Political and Literary Intelligence and I in an
Obscure Corner—You must expect to be greatly [the] loser on that score by
our Correspondence.”26
As time passed and Madison’s mood worsened, he drifted toward
melodrama, as people his age often will. His life was over before it had
begun; he would not do or experience anything exciting. He would not
make a difference. Hopelessness set in. He came to see his physical
afflictions as fate and concluded that he was not long for the world. He
unburdened himself in letters to friends, revealing his ambitions and
despair, his grandiosity and his gloomy sense that death was nigh. These
letters would be embarrassing had not most of us also sometimes felt this
way at Madison’s age. Writing again to Bradford:
[A] watchful eye must be kept on ourselves lest while we
are building ideal monuments of Renown and Bliss here
we neglect to have our names enrolled in the Annals of
Heaven. These thoughts come into my mind because I am
writing to you and thinking of you. As to myself I am too
dull and infirm now to look for any extraordinary things in
this world for I think my sensations for many months past
have intimated to me not to expect a long or healthy life,
yet it may be better with me after some time tho I hardly
dare expect it and therefore have little spirit and alacrity to
set about any thing that is difficult in acquiring and useless
in possessing after one has exchanged Time for Eternity.
But you have Health Youth Fire and Genius to bear you
along through the high tract of public Life and so may be
more interested and delighted in improving on hints that
respect the temporal though momentous concerns of
man.27
Yet things were happening in and around Madison’s small world that
would soon shake up his life and give him a direction and purpose.
Madison was, of course, aware of the epochal events taking shape in the
North American colonies, but he showed little interest prior to 1774. Near
the end of a letter he wrote to Bradford in September, 1773, for example,
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Apr. 28, 1773), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 83-84.
27
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 9, 1772), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 74-75.
26
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Madison commented briefly on the “scarcity of circulating cash” in Virginia,
but sheepishly excused this departure from his usual fare by noting, “I do
not meddle with Politicks but this Calamity lies so near the heart of every
friend of the Country that I could not but mention it.”28 As late as January,
1774, his reaction to news of the Boston Tea Party was chiefly to hope that
“Boston may conduct matters with as much discretion as they do with
boldness.” After offering the additional thought that “Political Contests are
necessary sometimes . . . to afford exercise and practise and to instruct in
the Art of defending Liberty and property,” Madison returned to more
comfortable topics. “But away with Politicks! Let me address you as a
Student and Philosopher & not as a Patriot now.”29
That all changed after England answered Boston’s defiance by closing
the port of Boston, abrogating the Massachusetts Charter, and requiring
Bostonians to quarter and feed British troops. America exploded when
news of the Coercive Acts reached its shores in the summer of 1774. There
was open rebellion in Massachusetts, as citizen-soldiers began massing
outside Boston, and the other colonies soon rallied to her side. Madison,
too, caught Patriot fever and became a convert to the cause. He swiftly
transformed into a militant Whig, advocating preparations for war, boasting
of his neighbors’ willingness to fight, and hoping “it will be a general thing
thro’ought this province.”30
The American Revolution became James Madison’s life.
Ketchum explains:

Ralph

From the uncertain, introspective, affectedly grave youth
he had been in the year after he graduated from college, he
had become a man consumed by a cause. He had
henceforth his vocation: he was a nation builder. During
the galvanizing years before 1776, when the great
revolution in loyalty took place (what John Adams called
the real American Revolution), James Madison shared,
emotionally and intellectually, a traumatic excitement vital
to the founders of the new United States. By the time of
the battles of Lexington and Concord, Madison had found
the purpose and adopted the ideals that were to motivate
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Sept. 25, 1773), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 95, 97 (footnote omitted).
29
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 104-05.
30
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Nov. 26, 1774), in 1 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 129 (footnote omitted).
28
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and guide him during forty years in public life and twenty
years as his country’s authentic sage.31
And what was that purpose? What were those ideals? We tend today
to lose sight of what Gordon Wood has aptly called the “radicalism of the
American Revolution.”32 The same cannot be said, however, for the
Americans who made it happen. In their eyes, the Revolution had
“reduc[ed] to practice, what, before, had been supposed to exist only in the
visionary speculations of theoretical writers.”33 So marveled St. George
Tucker in 1803, boasting how “The world, for the first time since the annals
of its inhabitants began, saw an original written compact formed by the free
and deliberate voices of the individuals disposed to unite in the same social
bonds; thus exhibiting a political phenomenon unknown to former ages
. . . .”34 This idea—that a nation could be created and governed based
explicitly on the consent of its people—was political heresy in the 1770s and
1780s, something contrary to all wisdom and experience. Yet it was
precisely this idea on which the American Revolution was staked, and those
who embraced it were, in the context of their times, radicals and idealists.
Like radicals and idealists in other ages and at other times, moreover,
the cause they fought for infused meaning into their lives, and they were
determined to see it through. The American Revolution was dedicated first
and foremost to the principle that “the people” governed, that “the people”
supplied government with its energy and direction, and that monarchical
institutions—that is, institutions not controlled by or accountable to the
people—needed to be eradicated. Making popular government work was
both the reason for and triumph of our Revolution, and it was this ideal that
Madison committed his life to achieving.
Knowing only what I have just recounted should be enough to give us
pause when we consider the conventional story about Madison. Such
doubts grow stronger, moreover, if we think about Madison’s passion for
the cause and its role in his life alongside his later actions: his alliance with
Jefferson, his opposition to Hamilton, his role in forming the Republican
Party, and his conduct as Secretary of State and President. All these are
hard to reconcile with the conservative anti-democrat who fills the pages of
today’s books and journals. Of course, it could be that Madison was one
KETCHUM, supra note 21, at 67.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991).
33
St. George Tucker, On Sovereignty and Legislature, in BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app.A,
reprinted in ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRITINGS 19 (Liberty Fund 1999) (1803).
34
Id.
31
32
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person before 1786 and after 1790 and a different person for the four years
in between. Or maybe we’ve been misreading what he had to say in those
critical years.
***
I will return to this theme below. There is, however, a second
background fact to bear in mind while reading Madison, this one
concerning the battles that dominated politics in the years after the
Revolution, when Madison’s thinking matured and came into focus. The
1780s and 1790s witnessed a steady stream of constitutional crises, one
controversy following another, until the young republic teetered on the
brink of disunion. There was the problem of financing the war, the fight
over negotiating with Spain to open the Mississippi, the failure of the
Articles of Confederation, Shay’s Rebellion, Ratification, Hamilton’s plans
for assumption and financing the debt, the national bank, the French
Revolution and American neutrality, the Whiskey Rebellion, the Jay Treaty,
the quasi-war with France, Fries Rebellion, the Alien and Sedition Acts, the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, the deadlocked election of 1800, and much
more. The 1790s, in particular, were a period of unparalleled economic
prosperity, yet domestic political strife was ferocious and displayed a deep
rancor and paranoia.
Naturally, each incident had its own peculiar causes and explanations.
But if we understand the period properly, we find one fundamental
disagreement underlying, and in many instances motivating, these
controversies, and that is the nature of popular participation in controlling
government.35 On one view—the conservative view associated with
Federalism in the 1790s—republicanism meant no more than the power of
the people to choose their leaders at election time. Between elections,
ordinary citizens had no direct agency or authority. They reverted to
subjects, whose duty and obligation was to obey what their political leaders
decided. “It is often said that ‘the sovereign and all other power is seated in
the people,’” Benjamin Rush complained during his brief period of High
Federalism. “This idea is unhappily expressed. It should be—’all power is
derived from the people.’ They possess it only on the days of their elections.
After this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they exercise it or
resume it, unless it is abused.”36

35
Cf. Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle over Republicanism and the Role of
Public Opinion, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405 (2004).
36
Benjamin Rush, On the Defects of the Confederation (1787), in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN RUSH 26, 28 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947); see James P. Martin, When Repression Is
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Though not everyone spoke of office-holding as a property right,
sentiments like these were pervasive among Federalists. An editorial in the
Columbia Centinal thus explained how “the sovereignty of the people is
delegated to those whom they have freely appointed to administer [the]
constitution, and by them alone can be rightly exercised, save at the stated
period of election, when the sovereignty is again at the disposal of the whole
people.”37 Between elections, however, the people needed only to listen and
to obey.
This is why Federalists so resented the “Democratic-Republican
societies” of the mid-1790s, which sought self-consciously “to act as
intermediaries between [the] political elite and a larger local citizenry,” and
why they were so discomfited by the new forms of electioneering and
politicking that emerged over the course of the decade.38 In the Federalist
world-view, ordinary citizens had no business trying to influence the
direction of government outside of elections, unless through respectful
petitions “humbly” beseeching duly constituted authorities for relief.39
Individuals might offer a “decent manly statement of opinion,”40 yet free
speech did not go so far as to include the right to publish something whose
“professed design is the superintendence of [the] government” or whose
“evident tendency, by obtaining an influence, is to lessen the power of
officers of government, and to lead, or rather to drive, the legislature, where
ever they please.”41 Oliver Wolcott went so far as to say it was “unlawful”
for any group or organization to assemble “for the avowed purpose of a
general influence and control upon the measures of government.”42

Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 166-69 (1999).
37
Order, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, Sept. 3, 1794, at 1.
38
David Waldstreicher, Federalism, the Styles of Politics, and the Politics of Style, in FEDERALISTS
RECONSIDERED 99, 101-11, 132 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1998). The
Democratic-Republican societies flourished briefly from 1793-96, until they were publicly
condemned by George Washington and lost credibility. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 487 (1993); EUGENE PERRY LINK, THE DEMOCRATICREPUBLICAN SOCIETIES 175-209 (1942); JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY
REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS 100-04 (1993).
39
Martin, supra note 36, at 160-66; see Seth Cotlar, The Federalists’ Transatlantic Cultural
Offensive of 1798 and the Moderation of American Democratic Discourse, in BEYOND THE FOUNDERS:
NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Jeffrey L.
Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson & David Waldstreicher eds., 2004).
40
SAMUEL KENDAL, A SERMON DELIVERED ON THE DAY OF NATIONAL THANKSGIVING 30
(Samuel Hall 1795).
41
To the Vigil, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Dec. 6, 1794, at 2.
42
1 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN ADAMS 178-79 (George
Gibbs ed., 1846) (Oliver Wolcott ed., Mar. 26, 1795).
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Particularly after 1793, as news spread of the Terror in France,
Federalists grew obsessed with the need to make citizens show “respect”
and “deference” and “obedience” to constituted authorities. Nathaniel
Emmons preached a sermon in 1799 whose talk about what “subjects” owed
their “rulers” makes Republican suspicions that their opponents were
secretly plotting monarchy appear almost reasonable:
The duty of submission naturally results from the
relations, which subjects bear to their rulers. There would
be no propriety in calling the body of the people subjects,
unless they were under obligation to obey those in the
administration of government. Every people either
directly or indirectly promise submission to their rulers.
Those, who choose their civil magistrates, do voluntarily
pledge their obedience, whether they take the oath of
allegiance or not. By putting power into the hands of their
rulers, they put it out of their own; by choosing and
authorizing them to govern, they practically declare, that
they are willing to be governed; and by declaring their
willingness to be governed, they equally declare their
intention and readiness to obey.43
The Republican view, which is to say the view espoused by Madison,
Jefferson, and their followers, was very nearly the opposite. The bedrock
principle of republicanism, they said, its essence and most basic
requirement, was that “the censorial power is in the people over the
government, and not in the government over the people.”44 Republicans
were scandalized by statements like those quoted above, which led
Jefferson mockingly to label his opponents “monocrats.”45 The idea that a
citizen became a subject between elections outraged and alarmed Jefferson
and his supporters. The American Revolution had not been fought merely
to establish a sequence of mini-monarchies time-limited by elections. The
suffrage was a device to secure popular control, but elected officials were
responsible to “the sense of the people” at all times.46 It was, indeed, this

Nathaniel Emmons, A Discourse Delivered on the National Fast (1799), in 2 AMERICAN
POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1023, 1027 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S.
Lutz eds., 1983).
44
James Madison, Speech in Congress on “Self-Created Societies” (Nov. 27, 1794), in
MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 14, at 552.
45
DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 265 (1962).
46
The quote comes from a letter Madison wrote to Jefferson during the crisis with France in
which Madison approved Jefferson’s suggestion that Congress do its best to slow down what
both saw as Adams’s effort to rush the nation into war by “an adjournment for the purpose of
43
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precise understanding that motivated and justified the institutional
experiments Republicans essayed throughout the 1790s: the DemocraticRepublican Societies, party newspapers, organized petition campaigns, the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, the formation of a political party with
party discipline, and so on, all efforts to keep the government in line with
popular opinion, and all opposed and condemned by Federalists (who
nevertheless frequently found themselves unwittingly forced to adopt the
same tactics).
***
The need to respect and preserve the paramount authority of the
community, particularly on constitutional questions, was a constant theme
in Madison’s writings, both as Publius and after. I have already adverted to
Madison’s largely overlooked admonition in Federalist 51 that “A
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul on the
government,” with structural devices serving only as “auxiliary
precautions.”47 Federalist 51 deals with separation of powers. But Madison
had made the same point, and at greater length, a week earlier in an essay
on federalism:
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight
of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject;
and to have viewed these different establishments [the
state and federal governments], not only as mutual rivals
and enemies, but as uncontrouled by any common
superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each
other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their
error. They must be told that the ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the
people alone; and that it will not depend merely on the
comparative ambition or address of the different
governments, whether either, or which of them, will be
able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of
the other. Truth no less than decency requires, that the
event in every case, should be supposed to depend on the
sentiments and sanction of their common constituents.48

consulting the Constituents on the subject of war.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 17 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 104-05.
47
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 349.
48
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 315-16 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Federalist
46 was published on January 29, 1788; Federalist 51 came out a week later, on February 6.
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Madison did not emphasize in these essays that popular control was
constant or that it would not be surrendered between elections, because in
1788 the issue had not yet been formulated in these terms. It emerged as
such only a few years later, when Federalists began denouncing opposition
to their measures on the ground that any “appeal to the people” constituted
“a gross violation offered to Freedom of Deliberation, in the constituted
authorities.”49 As battle lines formed around this fundamental question of
republican government, Madison again took up his pen to make his
thinking clear.
Between November, 1791 and December, 1792, Madison published at
least eighteen unsigned essays in the National Gazette, a newspaper he had
helped launch that was edited by his friend and former Princeton classmate,
Philip Freneau.50 Madison’s notes for these essays indicate that he
considered them an extension of the research and thinking he had done in
preparing for the Constitutional Convention and in writing The Federalist.51
The essays filled out Madison’s ideas about republican government and the
threats it faced, informed by further reading and, more important, by
several years of experience under the new Constitution. Among his core
messages, a point to which he returned again and again, was the primacy of
popular opinion in controlling a republican government, and the
concomitant obligation this imposed on citizens to remain vigilant and
involved.52
“Public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real
sovereign in every free one,” began an early essay titled Public Opinion, in
which Madison laid out his understanding of the respective roles of citizens
and government officials.53 Extending an idea borrowed from David
The quote is from John Fenno, editor of the Federalist newspaper and administration
Mouthpiece, The Gazette of the United States. Fenno was complaining about a petition campaign
that had been organized by opponents of the Jay Treaty in an effort to persuade Congress not
to enact enabling legislation. GAZETTE OF THE U.S., May 5, 1796, at 3.
50
Colleen Sheehan has argued that Madison published an overlooked nineteenth essay.
Colleen A. Sheehan, Madison’s Party Press Essays, 17 INTERPRETATION 355, 356-57 (1990)
[hereinafter Sheehan, Party Press].
51
LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 349, 351 (1995); Editorial Note, Madison’s National Gazette Essays, 19
Nov. 1791-20 & Dec. 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 110-12; Colleen A.
Sheehan, Madison and the French Enlightenment: The Authority of Public Opinion, 59 WM. & MARY
Q. 925, 927 (2002) [hereinafter Sheehan, Public Opinion].
52
See Sheehan, Party Press, supra note 50, at 357, 371-73. Madison stressed this point
because, as Lance Banning has noted, his political objective was “to arouse a public that
appeared disturbingly complacent in the face of tendencies and programs that he now believed
might be deliberately counterrevolutionary in intent.” BANNING, supra note 51, at 350.
53
James Madison, Public Opinion, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1791, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 170 [hereinafter Madison, Public Opinion].
49
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Hume,54 Madison was clear that public opinion not only would, but should
control the course of government. This was the first principle of
republicanism, as Madison understood it.55 Yet Madison did not believe
that elected officials should be mere ciphers. It might be one thing if public
opinion had been considered and was settled, but “there are cases, where
not being fixed, it may be influenced by the government.”56 And in such
cases, public officials were responsible for educating their constituents and
helping to shape their thinking.57 “This distinction [between settled and
unsettled public opinion], if kept in view, would prevent or decide many
debates on the respect due from the government to the sentiments of the
people.”58
While Madison saw an important role for government officials in
leading and helping to form public opinion, a point to which we shall
return below, his position departed sharply from the Federalist view that
anything “in the style of an appeal to the people” was not merely
inappropriate but beneath the dignity of a respectable public officer,
because political leaders were supposed “[t]o save the people from their
most dangerous enemy; to save them from themselves.”59 The widespread
publicizing of such sentiments by Federalist leaders led Madison, in turn, to
emphasize the public’s critical responsibility to be constantly watchful of
government, to ensure that it could never overstep its proper bounds.
Madison was adamant and unrelenting on this score, issuing a succession of
what were meant to be calls to action. From an essay on Charters: “Liberty
and order will never be perfectly safe, until a trespass on the constitutional
provisions for either, shall be felt with the same keenness that resents an
invasion of the dearest rights; until every citizen shall be an ARGUS to espy,

54
“[A]s FORCE is always on the side of the governed,” Hume wrote, “the governors have
nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is
founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well
as to the most free and most popular.” DAVID HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in
ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., rev. ed. 1985). For Hume the
point is descriptive, whereas Madison converts it into a normative claim. See Colleen A.
Sheehan, Public Opinion and the Formation of Civic Character in Madison’s Republican Theory, 67
REV. POL. 37, 38-41 (2005) [hereinafter Sheehan, Civic Character].
55
See Sheehan, Party Press, supra note 50, at 357, 371; Colleen H. Sheehan, The Politics of
Public Opinion: James Madison’s “Notes on Government,” 49 WM. & MARY Q. 609, 618-19 (1992)
[hereinafter Sheehan, Politics of Public Opinion].
56
Madison, Public Opinion, supra note 53, at 170.
57
Sheehan, Civic Character, supra note 54, at 44-48; Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51, at
950-54; Sheehan, Party Press, supra note 50, at 373.
58
Madison, Public Opinion, supra note 53, at 170.
59
Gouverneur Morris, Speeches to Congress, 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 41, 76 (1802).
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and ÆGEON to avenge, the unhallowed deed.”60 Returning to this theme in
an essay titled Government of the United States, Madison lionized the people’s
role as guardians of constitutional liberty: “Their eyes must be ever ready
to mark, their voice to pronounce, and their arm to repel or repair
aggressions on the authority of their constitutions; the highest authority
next to their own, because the immediate work of their own.”61 And yet
again in an essay titled The Union. Who Are Its Real Friends?: “The real
FRIENDS to the Union are those Who are friends to the authority of the people, the
sole foundation on which the Union rests.”62
Madison’s clearest explication of this position came in the final essay, a
contrived debate between a fictional character named “Republican” and his
nemesis, “Anti-republican,” published in late December, 1792. I will quote
this remarkable work at length, as it repays reading in the original. Madison
apes the Federalist position, but not by much, and the language he put in
Anti-republican’s mouth was in fact routinely used by his opponents.
Republican’s responses, in the meantime, reflected Madison’s own
sentiments. “Who Are the Best Keepers of the People’s Liberties?” Madison
asked in the essay’s title, and Republican’s answer (from which I drew the
title of my own book) was telling:
Republican., The people themselves. The sacred trust
can be no where so safe as in the hands most interested in
preserving it.
Anti-republican., The people are stupid, suspicious,
licentious. They cannot safely trust themselves. When
they have established government they should think of
nothing but obedience, leaving the care of their liberties to
their wiser rulers.
Republican., Although men are born free, and all
nations might be so, yet too true it is, that slavery has been
the general lot of the human race. Ignorant they have been
cheated; asleep they have been surprized; divided the yoke
has been forced upon them. But what is the lesson? That
because the people may betray themselves, they ought to
give themselves up, blindfold, to those who have an
James Madison, Charters, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 18, 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra
note 14, at 191-92 [hereinafter Madison, Charters].
61
Madison, Government, supra note 18, at 218.
62
James Madison, The Union. Who Are Its Real Friends?, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 31, 1792, in 14
PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 274.
60
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interest in betraying them? Rather conclude that the
people ought to be enlightened, to be awakened, to be
united, that after establishing a government they should
watch over it, as well as obey it.
Anti-republican., . . . It is not the government that is
disposed to fly off from the people; but the people that are
ever ready to fly off from the government. Rather say
then, enlighten the government, warn it to be vigilant,
enrich it with influence, arm it with force, and to the
people never pronounce but two words Submission and
Confidence.
Republican., The centrifugal tendency then is in the
people, not in the government, and the secret art lies in
restraining the tendency, by augmenting the attractive
principle of the government with all the weight that can be
added to it. What a perversion of the natural order of
things! to make power the primary and central object of the
social system, and Liberty but its satellite.63
This is surprising stuff for scholars who have imbibed the conventional
wisdom about Madison, and who might (if not tipped by his choice of
pseudonyms) be inclined to assume that Madison identified more with
Anti-republican than with Republican.64 Perhaps the same discrepancy
explains why most of them ignore or slight the National Gazette essays. But
passages like those quoted above surely do present a puzzle. After all, the
conventional wisdom about Madison did not come from nowhere. Plainly
Madison saw risks and dangers in democratic politics; plainly he wanted to
temper popular majorities. His letters and papers, not to mention his essays
as Publius, are filled with language displaying these efforts and anxieties.
One sees hints even in Republican’s responses to Anti-republican, which
acknowledge rather than deny the latter’s worries about the people. How,
then, do we explain what look like two very different Madisons? Was he
just confused and self-contradictory? Or did he, in fact, radically change his
ideas, as most Madison scholars apparently believe?65 Did the cautious
James Madison, Who Are the Best Keepers of the People’s Liberties?, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 20,
1792, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 426-27.
64
Consider in this regard Anti-republican’s next remark, in which he explained to Republican
how “[w]onderful as it may seem, the more you increase the attractive force of power, the
more you enlarge the sphere of liberty; the more you make government independent and
hostile toward the people, the better security you provide for their rights and interests.” Id.
65
See WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS, supra note 19, at 151-55; Douglas W. Jaenicke,
Madison v. Madison: The Party Press Essays v. The Federalist Papers, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
63
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Framer who wanted to put government into the hands of a disinterested
elite subsequently shed his worries and become a simple democrat?
I think not, because both characterizations are inaccurate. Certainly
Madison was concerned about the harm that could be done by popular
majorities, as much so in the decades after Ratification as the decade before.
The error in that part of the conventional wisdom is in its emphasis and
accents: in seeing Madison in the 1780s as more repelled by democratic
politics than he was, and, as a result, misreading him to embrace positions
fundamentally at odds with his deep, emotional commitment to popular
government and popular constitutionalism. Yet Madison always retained
the sense (learned in the 1780s) that popular rule could be dangerous and
unjust, and the Madison of the 1790s was never a simple democrat. Rather,
in both decades, and throughout his life, for that matter, Madison’s ideas
about popular politics and his conception of republicanism were different
and more complex (though also more consistent) than has generally been
understood.
***
We can start the process of reconstructing Madison’s thinking with his
essays in Federalists 49-50. This may seem a curious place to begin,
inasmuch as commentators typically read these essays as expressly rejecting
what I have been calling popular constitutionalism.66 And, it seems, for
good reason. In these papers, Madison went out of his way to criticize a
suggestion made by his friend Thomas Jefferson in a 1783 draft of a
constitution for Virginia. Jefferson had proposed to enforce the constitution
by calling popular conventions whenever “[a]ny two of the three branches
of government concur[ ] in opinion . . . that a convention is necessary for
altering this constitution, or correcting breaches of it . . . .”67 Such thinking
was characteristic of Jefferson, a thoroughgoing popular constitutionalist
who wanted direct, popular action to be the first and major line of defense
in securing compliance with the constitution. Conventions would enable

CONSTITUTION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AFTER TWO HUNDRED YEARS 116 (R. Maidment
& J. Zvesper, eds.,1989); Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51, at 927 n.7.
66
See RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 8, at 280-82 (the “ultimate conclusion” of
these papers was that “No constitutional dispute within government could ever be safely
remedied through an appeal to the people out-of-doors”); Jaenicke, supra note 65, at 136.
67
Draught of a Fundamental Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia (1783), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 209, 221 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1787).
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this, but in a less chaotic and disorderly fashion than the mobbing and
extralegal resistance relied on in the British constitutional tradition.68
Madison offered three pragmatic reasons against this sort of direct
resort to the people, which most scholars read as confirming his desire to
remove constitutional enforcement from popular control. First, Madison
worried that a too-frequent appeal to the people would “deprive the
government of that veneration, which time bestows on every thing, and
without which perhaps the wisest and freest government would not possess
the requisite stability.”69 Second, he said, “The danger of disturbing the
public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still
more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional
questions, to the decision of the whole society.”70 But “the greatest
objection of all,” according to Madison, was that the people would
invariably side with the most popular branch of government, namely, the
legislature.71 Nor was it an answer to this objection that the executive might
sometimes be “a peculiar favorite of the people.”72 For either way, the
public decision “could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the
question.”73 Often, the very officials whose actions were at issue would
gain election to the convention and, precisely because they were popular,
would dominate it. Still more fatal, the irregular and evanescent nature of
popular conventions made them highly susceptible to infection from “the
spirit of pre-existing parties, or of parties springing out of the question
itself.”74 As a result, “The passions . . . not the reason, of the public, would sit
in judgment” when “it is the reason of the public alone that ought to
controul and regulate the government.”75

On constitutional enforcement under the British constitution, see KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 24-29.
69
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 340 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 341-42.
The members of the legislative department . . . are numerous. They are
distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their connections of
blood, of friendship and of acquaintance, embrace a great proportion of
the most influential part of the society. The nature of their public trust
implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are more
immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of the
people. With these advantages, it can hardly be supposed that the
adverse party would have an equal chance for a favorable issue.
Id.
72
Id. at 342.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 343. Madison went on in Federalist 50 to explain why these objections were not
obviated by holding popular conventions are regular, pre-set intervals.
68

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/5

Kramer: "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular Constitutional

2006]

James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism

723

Plainly this reasoning stands in considerable tension with Madison’s
many statements in the National Gazette insisting that “[t]he people who are
the authors of [the Constitution], must also be its guardians.”76 It is
similarly at odds with Madison’s reliance in Federalists 45-46 on popular
enforcement to secure federalism, and with his comment in Federalist 51 that
the people are meant to provide “the primary controul on the
government.”77 The contradiction is evident even in Federalist 49 itself,
which begins by recognizing that because “the people are the only
legitimate fountain of power” it is “the people themselves[,] who, as the
grantors of the [Constitution], can alone declare its true meaning and
enforce its observance,” and which concludes by insisting that “it is the
reason of the public alone that ought to control and regulate the
government.”78
Statements like these (and countless others that could be cited) make
clear that Madison embraced popular constitutionalism and, no less than
Jefferson, believed that the public had a right and a responsibility to enforce
the Constitution. But, then, why did he reject Jefferson’s proposal? How
could he simultaneously say that “every good citizen will be at once a
centinel over the rights of the people; over the authorities of the [federal]
government; and over both the rights and the authorities of the [state]
governments,”79 while at the same time insisting that “appeals to the
people” in the form of popular conventions were “neither a proper nor an
effectual provision” for safeguarding constitutional limits?80
There is a simple answer to this seeming contradiction. What Madison
objected to in Jefferson’s proposal was not the principle it embodied, but the
way it put that principle into action. Like Jefferson, Madison believed in
popular control, believed that “the sense of the people” should decide what
the government did and how the Constitution was interpreted.81 But
Jefferson’s approach looked for a kind of popular control that would not
(and could not) work in practice because it was too unmediated and direct.
14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 348; see supra note 47.
78
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 69, at 339, 343.
79
Madison, Government, supra note 18, at 178.
80
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 69, at 343.
81
See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see also James Madison, A Candid State of
Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 370-71 (true
republicans are “naturally offended at every public measure that does not appeal to the
understanding and to the general interest of the community”); James Madison, Consolidation,
NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 1791, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 137-38 (worrying that
without state governments “neither the voice nor the sense” of the people “could ever be
combined or called into effect”); Sheehan, Party Press, supra note 50, at 371-73.
76
77
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Among the lessons Madison took from his study of history was that
popular government could succeed only if decision-making was mediated
and refined through a system of accountable representatives. As he
explained in Federalist 10, the critical distinction between pure democracies,
which experience taught were short-lived “spectacles of turbulence and
contention,” and a well designed republic was precisely “the delegation of
the Government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest.”82 A proper “scheme of representation,” thus, “open[ed] a different
prospect and promis[ed] the cure for which we are seeking.”83 It did not
matter that a question was constitutional in nature: turning directly to “the
whole society” for an immediate answer (which is how the Founding
generation saw popular conventions)84 was perilous and unnecessary. Not
because the public lacked the right to decide, and not because the public
would never do so. The public’s right to decide was, in fact, incontestable.
But the experience of the ancients (as well as that of the Americans
themselves) taught that a nation would all-too-quickly collapse if the public
decided too directly, too often, and on too many things. Instead, a proper
system of representation was needed: one that would, if carefully
constructed, secure popular government while reducing the need for direct
popular action, which could then be held in reserve for use only on, as
Madison put it, “certain great and extraordinary occasions.”85
***
But how would this work? What, in other words, was Madison’s
representation-based alternative to Jefferson’s direct popular
constitutionalism? Having rejected Jefferson’s approach, Madison went on
to spell out his own version of popular constitutionalism in the very next
essay, the famous Federalist 51.86

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 10, at 61-62.
Id. at 62.
84
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). People “ascribed to one set of elected representatives meeting
in convention a more popular character, and consequently a greater authority, than every
subsequent set of representatives meeting as a legislature.” Id. at 91; see RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS, supra note 8, at 93-102; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 9, at 306-10, 319, 328-43.
85
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 69, at 339.
86
Placement alone might have suggested that these three essays have something to do with
one another. Yet with a few notable exceptions (e.g., RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note
8, at 280-82), commentators seem to have simply missed the connection. Typical discussions of
Madison’s ideas in The Federalist either ignore Federalists 49-50 or treat these essays as a
puzzling detour from the analysis of separation of powers that Madison had begun in
Federalists 47-48. See JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN
GOVERNMENT (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003); RICHARD K. MATTHEWS, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: JAMES
82
83

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/5

Kramer: "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular Constitutional

2006]

James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism

725

As we have just seen, Madison thought popular government could
work only if politics were mediated through representative institutions. But
representation was only a start and was not, by itself, sufficient. After all,
the popular conventions championed by Jefferson consisted of
representatives chosen by the people. More was necessary to refine and
construct a public decision worthy of respect, and that more, Madison
explained in Federalist 51, consisted of establishing multiple representative
institutions within an enlarged polity and setting them in proper relation to
one another. Or, in Madison’s own words, “the defect must be supplied, by
so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping
each other in their proper places.”87 This meant, in particular, and as
Madison explained in the remainder of Federalist 51, utilizing a bicameral
legislature, an executive veto, federalism, and extensive size.
As with Federalists 49-50, we cannot accurately comprehend Madison’s
logic without first ridding ourselves of a widely shared misunderstanding.
For few passages from The Federalist are more familiar than this one, and
few have been more consistently and egregiously misread. Conventional
wisdom tells us that Madison sought to preserve constitutional limits by
devitalizing popular politics and creating a balanced equilibrium within the
government, forming “a machine that would go of itself.”88 On this view,
the Framers complicated the system by establishing separate branches and
departments and then giving each a constitutional power to check or
obstruct the others. Their hypothesis was that officials within the different
institutions could be counted on to protect the powers and prerogatives of
their respective offices. They would, as a result, reliably act in the ordinary
course of governing to prevent rivals in the other branches from
overreaching in violation of the Constitution. Constitutional scholars and
political philosophers treat this strategy as nothing less than sheer genius.
“[O]fficials would not have to be public-spirited,” one commentator
observes breathlessly, because “their self-interested defence of the power of

MADISON AND THE HEARTLESS EMPIRE OF REASON (1995); GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT:
JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING (1999); MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE
FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987). This is, I believe, both a cause and an effect of the
general misreading of Federalist 51 discussed below.
87
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 347-48.
88
The quote is from an 1888 speech by James Russell Lowell to the Reform Club of New
York. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 18 (1986); see Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 950 (2005).
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their offices would still contribute unintentionally to the maintenance of the
constitutional balance.”89
The problem is that critical aspects of this reading of Federalist 51 do not
sit well or even make particular sense. The argument turns, for instance, on
the relevant institutions each having a constitutional power to block
unconstitutional acts of the others. Yet while some of the devices Madison
discussed fit this description, others do not. States have no constitutional
power to block the federal government, not after the Supremacy Clause. So
why mention federalism? And extensive size has nothing at all to do with
interbranch or intergovernmental checking. Yet the discussion of these two
features took up more than half of Federalist 51, while Madison breezed
through bicameralism and the executive veto in a single paragraph.
More damning still, this interpretation of Federalist 51 rests on the
implausible assumption that officeholders in different branches would
make protecting the institutional prerogatives of their respective offices a
priority. Even without political parties, why would anyone expect
legislators to object to Presidential action they agreed with and supported?
Why assume that state governments would oppose federal legislation that
did what the states wanted? As Daryl Levinson has recently pointed out,
politicians must normally be expected to put political concerns above
institutional ones.90 Not always, of course, and we do occasionally see an
institution act to protect itself contrary to the immediate political interests of
its members. But this is unusual, and that was as true in 1788 as it is today.
No thoughtful politician or careful student of politics—and Madison was
both—could possibly have thought otherwise.
It is unlikely, to say the least, that Madison would have built his whole
theory around such a farfetched proposition. And, sure enough, the
language of Federalist 51 supports a different and more sensible reading. In
explaining his argument, Madison says that “the great security . . . consists
in giving those who administer each department, the necessary
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”91 We
can presume, I think, that Madison understood perfectly well that the
“personal motives” and “interests” of elected officials would be political
motives and political interests—in other words, that officials would have
political agendas they were seeking to advance, agendas that were
89
90
91
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responses to the desires and beliefs of their constituents. The key to making
the Constitution work lay in finding a way to harness these political
interests, and the power to advance them by using constitutional authority
granted to the institutions in which the officials worked, for the benefit of
constitutional enforcement.
If this is right, and I think it must be, it suggests revisiting the prevailing
understanding of Madison’s theory of constitutional enforcement, as well as
his broader theory of deliberative democracy, both of which rest heavily on
this (mis)reading of Federalist 51. We should do so, moreover, by looking
comprehensively at what Madison said and did during the Founding
period, reading what he wrote as Publius not in isolation, but rather against
the background of his earlier and later actions and in conjunction with his
writings of the early 1790s. And when we do that, a very different Madison
emerges, with a very different theory of deliberative democracy and
popular constitutionalism.
***
As we have seen, Madison began from the conviction that a
government is republican only if and to the extent that its actions are
guided and controlled by public opinion. If I seem to be making this point a
lot, that’s because I am: because it has been so widely neglected, and
because its importance as Madison’s first principle cannot be overstated.92
Establishing a republican government, the cause to which Madison
dedicated his life and the object toward which all his thinking was directed,
meant establishing “a Government of opinion.”93
This concept of opinion requires a bit of elaboration and some
qualification. To begin with, when Madison spoke of public opinion he did
not have something abstract or imaginary in mind. Modern political
philosophers have tended to flatten the idea of popular sovereignty, to treat
it as a disembodied or purely notional justification for government. Not so
Madison. He understood public opinion to be “an operationally active and
authoritative sovereign,” reflecting definite views or positions on public

92
As will become obvious, my discussion here owes a great intellectual debt to Colleen
Sheehan, who has, almost singly and for more than fifteen years, argued that we misread
Madison by paying too little attention to his writings of the 1790s and his emphasis on popular
opinion. See Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51; Sheehan, Party Press, supra note 50;
Sheehan, Civic Character, supra note 54; Sheehan, Politics of Public Opinion, supra note 55.
93
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 265 (Philip R. Fendall ed., 1865) [hereinafter LETTERS OF
MADISON].
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affairs that had been given concrete expression by the people themselves.94
This is why he saw ignoring public opinion as counterrevolutionary, and
why he insisted that true republicans were “naturally offended at every
public measure that does not appeal to the understanding and to the
general interest of the community.”95 In concrete terms, respect for opinion
required elected officials to run their ideas past constituents and let the
public’s reactions determine what the government did.
There is, of course, an important sense in which this sort of public
control is inescapable.
Government must have the community’s
acquiescence, if not active support, and no regime can survive if it
continuously negates popular will. That was Hume’s point about how even
the most “despotic” and “military” governments ultimately “have nothing
to support them but opinion.”96 Certainly Madison believed this,97 as did
his political opponents. But they drew very different conclusions from it.
For Federalists, who wanted government lodged safely in the hands of
gentlemen like themselves, the lesson was to dampen popular politics: to
de-politicize public life to the extent possible, and by doing so to foster
passive acceptance of government action. Federalists believed in
republicanism, but saw themselves as clear-eyed pragmatists with no
illusions about the capacity of ordinary citizens to make “disinterested” or
“virtuous” judgments about policy. Popular rule needed to be trammeled
and hedged in order to ensure that decisions were made only by the most
competent and qualified. Making government remote was one way to
achieve this, which is why Federalists preferred national to state power. It
is also why they condemned anything that smacked of popular
mobilization, and why they relentlessly propagandized the need for
submission, obedience, and deference.98

Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51, at 948; Sheehan, Politics of Public Opinion, supra note
55, at 619; see also KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 3-8.
95
James Madison, A Candid State of Parties, NAT’L GAZETTE, Sept. 22, 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 14, at 370-71.
96
HUME, supra note 54.
97
See Madison, Charters, supra note 60, at 191-92. “All power has been traced up to opinion.
The stability of all governments and security of all rights may be traced to the same source.
The most arbitrary government is controuled where the public opinion is fixed. The despot of
Constantinople dares not lay a new tax, because every slave thinks he ought not.” Id.
98
In essence, Federalists wanted a monarchical social order without a monarch and with an
aristocracy based on wealth and accomplishment rather than birth. Elections were fine, but
only so long as these remained (as they were in England and had been in America) contests
among gentlemen, whose purpose and effect was to shore up conventional patterns of
deference by requiring notables to spend a few days “familiariz[ing]” themselves through
personal solicitation or by “tak[ing] a chearful cup” with ordinary folk. 2 THE DIARY OF
94
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Because of his brief alliance with those who held such views, Madison
has long been treated as sharing their philosophy and objectives, at least
during the period of common partnership in the 1780s. And clearly there
were areas of agreement. Madison was perhaps the foremost advocate of
using national power to check state politics, and Federalist 10 shows how he
also believed that government leadership should be in the hands of an elite.
But Madison had his own, very different reasons for taking these positions,
as we shall see in a moment. What agreements existed in the 1780s between
him and people like Hamilton, Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris turned out
to be on tactics and to have obscured profound differences in philosophy.
Madison’s beliefs were, indeed, very nearly the opposite of theirs. He
thought public opinion should control what government did, and he held
that creating a republican government meant embracing and maximizing
public control, not acting to pacify or divert it. To Madison’s way of
thinking, the inevitability of popular control gave rise to a corresponding
responsibility to refine and improve public deliberations, so as to ensure
that the sovereign, controlling public opinion was also reasonable and just.
This last point is crucial, as it draws attention to an important
normative qualification in Madison’s thinking about opinion. On the one
hand, Madison recognized that the will of the majority must rule. “In
republican Government,” he wrote in his memo on Vices of the Political
System of the United States, “the majority however composed, ultimately give
the law.”99 This was, indeed, “the fundamental principle of republican
Government.”100 On the other hand, a government could be republican and
still be unjust, tyrannical, and not worth serving or preserving. Madison
had not dedicated his life to the cause of republicanism without regard for
its quality or content. A republican government could be more just, but only
LANDON CARTER, 1752-1778, at 1008-09 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1965) (confessing he was turned out
of office for failing to “familiarize myself among the People”); see also ROBERT MUNFORD, THE
CANDIDATES; OR, THE HUMOURS OF A VIRGINIA ELECTION 34 (Wm. & Mary 1949) (1770) (Sir John
Toddy is liked by plain folk in this farce because he “wont turn his back upon a poor man, but
will take a chearful cup with one as well as another.”). An analogy between eighteenthcentury elections and medieval carnival, characterized by a temporary upending of normal
social relations in order to reinforce them, is made in MORGAN, supra note 84, at 174-208, and in
Andrew W. Robertson, Voting Rites Revisited: Electioneering Ritual, 1790-1820, in BEYOND THE
FOUNDERS: NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson & David Waldstreicher eds., 2004). As Gordon Wood
has observed, Federalists believed in democracy, “but not our modern democracy; rather, they
believed in a patrician-led classical democracy in which ‘virtue exemplified in government will
diffuse its salutary influence though the society.’” Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness, supra
note 8, at 83.
99
James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 348, 355 [hereinafter Madison, Vices of the Political System].
100
Id. at 354.
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if the majority that ruled did not itself become despotic or tyrannical. And
the lesson of the 1780s was that this might not be easy and certainly could
not be taken for granted. So while republicanism meant subjecting “the will
of the government to the will of the society” (meaning the will of the
majority), that alone was not enough. It was necessary also to subject “the
will of the society to the reason of the society.”101
In affirming the authority of public opinion, in other words, Madison
was preaching majority rule but not simple majoritarianism. Majority
opinion would hold sway, but the majority opinion that should hold sway
had to be more than the fleeting passions or preferences of the moment,
more than the unreflective reactions of a transient majority of citizens.
Colleen Sheehan explains:
Madison did not simply equate public opinion with the
will of the majority. Public opinion [was] not the sum of
ephemeral passions and narrow interests; it [was] not an
aggregate of uninformed minds and wills. Rather, public
opinion require[d] the refinement and transformation of
the views, sentiments, and interests of the citizens into a
public mind guided by the precepts of reason, resulting in
‘the reason . . . of the public’ or ‘the reason of the
society.’102
This was Jefferson’s point when he urged in his first inaugural address that
Americans “bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be
reasonable.”103
***
Ensuring that the will of the majority was reasonable was, in the first
instance, a responsibility of leadership. Those whose situation in life had
afforded them the opportunity to elevate their minds had a corresponding
obligation to elevate those of their fellow citizens, particularly on matters of
politics and government. “The class of the literati,” Madison wrote in notes
to himself, “are the cultivators of the human mind—the manufacturers of
useful knowledge—the agents of the commerce of ideas,—the censors of
James Madison, Universal Peace, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1792, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 206-07.
102
Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51, at 948.
103
Id. The quote can be found in Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in
1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 321, 322-23 (J. Richardson
ed., 1897).
101
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public manners—the teachers of the arts of life and the means of
happiness.”104 It was the task of this elite to educate and edify, to foster a
process of deliberation that refined and enlightened public sentiment in a
fashion sufficient for the demands of self-government.
This responsibility lay particularly on elected officials. We have already
noted how Madison reserved a role for government in helping to shape
public opinion where it was “not . . . fixed.”105 We now see why. As
Colleen Sheehan notes, precisely because public opinion is sovereign, “the
republican statesman is obliged to advance its formation and expression.”106
It was with this in mind, for instance, that Madison emphasized how
critical “Representatives going from, and returning among every part” of the
nation were to securing republican liberty a safeguard whose importance,
he said, was matched only by “a circulation of newspapers through the entire
body of the people.”107 Representatives traveling to and from the seat of
government acted as “agents for the exchange of political ideas among the
citizenry. As elected officials whose task was to deliberate on issues of
national import, they [could] both attend to the views of their constituents
and convey back to them the concerns and interests of the nation at
large.”108
This sort of educative leadership would be effective, however, only if
proper leaders were in place. Hence Madison’s excitement when he
realized how a large republic could foster “a process of elections as will
most certainly extract from the mass of the Society the purest and noblest
characters which it contains.”109 Madison’s objective was not to select an
elite that would deliberate for the public; nor was it to place this elite at such
a remove from the people that it could work free from their interference.
Rather, Madison wanted “the ablest Statesmen & soundest Republicans” to
104

Notes for the National Gazette Essays, in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 157,

168.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (quoting Madison, Public Opinion, supra note
53, at 170) (while public opinion must be obeyed once it has settled, “where not . . . fixed, it
may be influenced by the government”).
106
Sheehan, Politics on Public Opinion, supra note 55, at 620.
107
Madison, Public Opinion, supra note 53, at 170. Alongside these devices Madison also
listed “good roads, domestic commerce, [and] a free press,” that is, “[w]hatever facilitates a
general intercourse of sentiments” among the people. Id.
108
Sheehan, Public Opinion, supra note 51, at 953.
109
Madison, Vices of the Political System, supra note 99, at 357. As Madison explained the
same point in Federalist 10, size would make it “more difficult for unworthy candidates to
practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried” and so result “in
the substitution of Representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render
them superior to local [views], and to schemes of injustice.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note
10, at 64.
105
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seek positions of leadership so they could teach and inform the public,
elevating the discussion, fending off local prejudices, and improving the
citizens’ minds and morals.110 Those in office, whoever they were, would
necessarily know more about public affairs than ordinary citizens. It would
be their job to know and would be what they spent their time learning
about. Public officials were, as a result, in the best position to provide the
kind of civic education that was essential to guide the public’s thinking. To
play their part well, however, these public officials needed to be the sorts of
people who would use their superior knowledge and position to move
public opinion in the direction of reason, moderation, and justice.
The political process Madison imagined was thus dramatically different
from the sort of deferential politics that Federalists wanted (and that
Madison has often erroneously been thought to have favored).111
“Symbolically,” explains historian Christopher Grasso, “the ‘public’ came to
be seen, not as a body ruled by a sovereign head, but as a mind that ruled
itself.”112 This did not mean the flattening or elimination of all distinctions;
neither Madison, nor Jefferson, nor anyone else then alive was quite so
modern. But it did embody a profound, if subtle, shift in the nature of
politics. At the risk of oversimplifying, one can describe the general
direction of change as follows: Where Federalists emphasized the power
and patronage of a wealthy gentry whose superior virtue deserved
submission, Madison’s politics are better characterized as a conversation, a
conversation in which the elite now led by persuasion an electorate actively
engaged in making its own judgments and decisions.
***
The extended republic served a second critical purpose in Madison’s
scheme, one that helps explain why, having laid the argument out in
Federalist 10, he included it again in Federalist 51.113 Generating reasonable
and reasoned public opinions would take time and would require a proper
forum for deliberation. This was difficult to achieve in a small republic,
where the limited range of competing interests made forming a factious
majority too easy. Virtuous leaders could, in theory, block this from
happening, but in practice one could not depend on it:

See Jack N. Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION, supra note 8, at 261, 271. The quote is from Letter from James Madison to
Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 350, 354.
111
See authorities cited supra note 8.
112
CHRISTOPHER GRASSO, A SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CONNECTICUT 282, 448-51 (1999).
113
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 351-53.
110
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It is vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to
adjust these clashing interests, and render them all
subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will
not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an
adjustment be made at all, without taking into view
indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely
prevail over the immediate interest which one party may
find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of
the whole.114
Added safeguards were needed to blunt the process of majority
formation: to slow it down long enough to give government officials and
other members of the “literati” an opportunity to lead a proper public
debate. And among the surest of these additional safeguards was simply to
make the republic larger:
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other.115
The difficulty of forming such majorities would, in turn, create time and
space for the kind of public debate and discussion that was necessary to
refine popular opinion and help it coalesce around a just decision.
Note how this description of the effects of enlarging a republic differs
from the usual understanding of Madison’s famous argument. The usual
assumption is that, because Madison feared that legislators would be too
responsive to majorities, he wanted to prevent majorities from forming,
thereby leaving officials free to craft solutions that satisfied an independent
and objective notion of “the public good.” But, as we have seen, Madison
was committed to the idea of majority rule and believed in the sovereignty
of public opinion. His actual concern was more focused. It was not
majorities that Madison feared. It was unreflective, factious majorities: the
kind of majorities that he thought could be formed all too easily and all too
quickly at the state level. The benefit of extensive size was that, by making
it more difficult for majorities to form, a large republic gave reasoned
argument an opportunity to prevail, so that whatever “coalition of a
114
115

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 10, at 61.
Id. at 64.
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majority of the whole society” eventually emerged “could seldom take
place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good.”116
***
Yet this still was not enough. For it was dangerous, even in a large
republic, to entrust the role of collecting and acting on public opinion to a
small, concentrated set of individuals. There is, after all, the risk we noted
above that “enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” And
even if voters did manage to elect only “the most diffusive and established
characters,”117 these representatives would regularly face vexing problems
that lacked determinate solutions, for the Constitution was obscure and
imprecise in important respects.118 Given such risks and such problems, it
was not enough just to elect representatives, even in an extended territory.
“The genius of Republican liberty” demanded as well that “the trust should
be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands.”119
By “number of hands,” Madison did not mean a big government,
though he did believe that “the Representatives must be raised to a certain
number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few.”120 More precisely,
Madison meant a complicated government: a government that provided
“double security . . . to the rights of the people” because its powers were
“first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments.”121
Structural innovations in the form of federalism and separation of powers
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 353.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 10, at 63.
118
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 231-39 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). In this
wonderful and underappreciated essay, Madison lays out the many causes of textual
indeterminacy, including the difficulty of balancing “energy” and liberty, the complexity of
drawing a line between state and federal power, the impossibility of defining the powers and
divisions of government given the state of the “science of Government” and limitations in the
use of language, the “interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States,” and the resulting
need to compromise. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 118, at 235, 237. An excellent analysis
may be found in RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS, supra note 8, at 156-60.
119
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 118, at 234.
120
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 10, at 62-63. Madison’s views on the proper size of the
legislature were complex: there needed to be enough representatives to make corruption
difficult, but not so many as to make governing impossible; and, in all events, the ratio of
representatives to constituents needed to be balanced. For an analysis, see BANNING, supra
note 51, at 195-233.
121
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 351; see also Madison, Charters, supra note 60, at
191-92 (arguing that the people of the United States have a special responsibility to maintain
their constitutions given “[t]he complicated form of their political system, arising from the
partition of government between the states and the union, and from the separations and
subdivisions of the several departments in each . . . .”).
116
117
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thus became the final elements of Madison’s theory, indispensable because
they provided the means to make the “personal motives” and political
interests of elected officials work to advance the cause of republican liberty
and popular constitutionalism.
The idea, once understood, is really quite ingenious. We complicate the
government by creating several levels, each with multiple branches or
departments. All the departments at each level are then made accountable
to the people. (Not courts, of course: the judiciary was intentionally
designed to be unaccountable. But courts were not a significant player in
Madison’s thinking about constitutional enforcement in the 1780s, which is
why they have no role in Federalist 51 and make only cameo appearances in
his other essays.122 I will come back to courts below, because they were
eventually assigned a part. For now, the point to recognize is that
Madison’s original theory of constitutional enforcement was political in
nature, and the “departments” Madison had in mind when he wrote about
separation of powers were the House, the Senate, and the Executive, that is,
the branches of government whose members were popularly accountable.)
Accountable, to be sure, but in different ways and to different
constituencies within the larger national polity. Members of the House of
Representatives were directly accountable, for instance, but to small
constituencies relative to the other branches. Members of the Senate were
accountable to larger state-wide constituencies, but only indirectly. The
President was still more indirectly accountable, but in his case to the nation
as a whole. It was similar at the state level: most of the states likewise had
bicameral legislatures with each house chosen under a different scheme of
representation, and all the states picked their executives by more or less
indirect means; some states also had independently elected executive
councils, again chosen by various means.123
These differences in how officials were chosen and to whom they were
accountable mattered, because they meant that members of the different
governments and of different departments within these governments would
have different political interests and agendas. This would be true,
moreover, no matter how public officers conceived their roles. Perhaps
they would put their energy into serving some notion of “the public good,”
or maybe they would back whichever measures maximized their chances
for reelection. Or, more realistically, they might do a bit of both. It actually
See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
Madison discussed differences among the states in THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 327-31
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). For a somewhat more systematic survey, see
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS app., at 315-31 (2001).
122
123
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would not matter. For however elected officials approached their jobs, their
perceptions of what the public wanted or needed, or of what furthered their
political careers, would necessarily be shaped by the different situations in
which they found themselves by virtue of the location and structure of their
office. By then assigning the different offices ways to block or obstruct each
other, these varied and various perspectives, with their “opposite and rival
interests,” could be used to supply “the defect of better motives” in
safeguarding the Constitution by securing the sovereignty of public
opinion.
How would it work? Suppose the President takes some action, say,
unilaterally declaring U.S. neutrality in a war between England and France,
or initiating a plan to wiretap American citizens without first obtaining
warrants. If that action is contrary to the political interests of actors in any
part of the system, and a plausible constitutional objection exists or could be
made, we can expect to see the issue raised. If, therefore, no one anywhere
in this complex system objects, we have about as good an assurance as we
can ever realistically hope to get that there is no plausible objection.
Obviously, that’s not certain; no system is infallible or completely
foolproof. One can in theory imagine actions that are unconstitutional but
serve the interests of elected officials at every level and in every
department. Or there could be times when potential objectors are not
paying attention, or where the stakes for everyone are simply too low to
matter. But with so many different institutions, staffed by politicians with
so many different potential interests to motivate them, universal
acquiescence may be the best possible vote of confidence we can generate.
Conversely, if there is a potential objection, we should expect to see the
issue raised by someone in this complex system, and we should expect that
someone to use or attempt to use the powers of his or her office to block or
obstruct the action in question. This will not end the matter, even if
successful. Nor is it supposed to do so. For the use of a constitutional check
is not meant to conclude a dispute. It is meant to begin one: to force the
kind of public debate needed for “the reason of the society” to emerge and
coalesce.
To illustrate, suppose the House debates a bill and concludes that a
proposed law reflects good policy and is also constitutional. A majority of
the Senate disagrees: they do not like the law, and they believe it
unconstitutional for some reason. They refuse to pass it. What happens
next? The bill may die, as perhaps it should if members of the House give
the law a low priority or have no answer to the Senate’s objections. But if
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they care and have an argument to support their position, the Senate’s
refusal to act should arouse a response. Recall Madison’s admonition about
the importance of representatives “going from, and returning among every
part of [the people].”124 Madison assumed that members of the House who
supported the bill would go back to their constituents and argue that the
Senate was wrong, that the law was both useful and constitutional and that
voters needed to put pressure on the Senate to relent. Senators, in the
meantime, were not expected to sit idly by. They were supposed to do the
same thing: return home, give speeches, write editorials, and make their
case that the law was undesirable or unconstitutional. And so we would
have a genuine public debate in which, eventually, the community would
settle on a view, at which point the political pressure brought to bear would
force the losing branch to yield.
Even this might not end the matter. Suppose, for example, that public
opinion led the Senate to succumb. There might still be objections from the
President, who could exercise a veto, or from politicians in the states, who
had at their disposal a variety of devices politically to challenge federal law
(devices Madison fleshed out in Federalists 45-46). In either case, the debate
would then continue to whatever end the public eventually embraced. And
in this way, separation of powers and federalism became instrumentalities
for generating a robust public discussion, initiated and led by political
leaders acting for their own reasons, through which the “reason of the
society” could be developed and “the people themselves” retain control.
This, I believe, is what Madison had in mind when he spoke of
connecting the “interest of the man” with “the constitutional rights of the
place.”125 This is how “[a]mbition [could] be made to counteract
ambition”126 to ensure compliance with the Constitution. But the
compliance we get, and the compliance Madison sought, is compliance with
the Constitution as understood by the sole, final arbiter of its meaning, “the
people themselves; who, as the grantors of the commission, can alone
declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance.”127
Note how the people’s control, while real and substantial, is not direct.
It is indirect: mediated through popular responses to arguments and to the
action or inaction of representatives in different parts of different
governments, representatives who are in turn taking their cues from the
124
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (quoting Madison, Public Opinion, supra note 53,
at 170).
125
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 349.
126
Id.
127
THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 69, at 339.
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public. It is, nevertheless, genuine popular control, a system of
constitutional regulation that avoids the pitfalls of Jefferson’s direct popular
constitutionalism without betraying the basic commitment to
republicanism.128
***
And now, finally, what about courts? As already noted, judges were for
the most part left out of Madison’s original scheme for interpreting and
enforcing the Constitution. At the Philadelphia Convention, he grudgingly
conceded the judiciary a role mediating boundary disputes between the
national government and the states, though with little enthusiasm and low
expectations for their efficacy.129 More telling, he ignored courts entirely
when it came to separation of powers. The process Madison envisioned
and found attractive was meant to be played out amongst the government’s
politically accountable branches and between those branches and the
community.
This made sense even apart from concerns about
republicanism, since nothing in history or experience suggested that courts
could or would, much less should, be an important factor in enforcing a

128
This description will hopefully clarify the relationship between popular constitutionalism
and direct popular action. Popular constitutionalism does not depend on popular action
targeted against the government, such as the mobs of colonial America, though it may be
responsive to such action. It is, however, mainly concerned with popular action that seeks to
work through the government, whether in the form of a social movement, a political party, the
myriad private associations of civil society, or elected representatives’ responses to the general
moods and dispositions of voters. Popular constitutionalism is found in the relationship
between the formal agencies of government and the citizens these agencies seek to serve. It is
open to popular movements in any and all forms, requiring only that these movements seek to
achieve their ends under the Constitution in the form of official action of some sort (laws,
constitutional amendments, executive action, even judicial decisions). Its energy and ideas
often, though not always, come from outside the state’s formal organs, but it depends on these
organs to test and mediate and give form to the demands of citizens. Popular constitutionalism
is, as a result, fluid: as fluid as politics itself.
129
Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (the
tribunal which is to decide “is to be established under the general Government”), with THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 45-46, at 308-323 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (describing how
states can protect themselves from federal overreaching), and Letter from Madison to Jefferson,
in 10 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 206, 211 (complaining how reliance on the judiciary
will not work). As is well known, Madison wanted to control the states through a
congressional negative on state laws. The Supremacy Clause was offered and accepted at the
Philadelphia Convention only after this proposal was defeated, put forth by states’ rights
advocate Luther Martin precisely because it was so weak, which is also why no similar effort
was made explicitly to endorse judicial review of federal legislation. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 74-76. As Madison’s letter to Jefferson indicates, this decision
thoroughly discouraged him, though of course he made the best he could of it in defending the
document that ultimately emerged.
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constitution. (Consider in this regard that the phrase “constitutional law”
did not yet exist and would not come into use before the 1790s.)130
Madison supported an independent judiciary, of course, like most
others at the time.131 But also like most others, he did so for reasons having
nothing to do with constitutional enforcement. Instead, he saw the need for
independence chiefly through the lens of British and colonial experience,
which had no doctrine of judicial review,132 but which taught that judges
needed tenure and salary protection to immunize them from being
influenced by the more powerful political branches in ordinary civil and
criminal cases.133 To avoid this, Madison advised his friend Caleb Wallace,
DANIEL HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 255 (2005).
131
See Gerhard Casper, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and Judicial Independence, in ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 281 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). As Casper explains, support for
“independence” was well nigh universal, but its definition and the problem of balancing
independence with accountability in a republican system produced widespread disagreement
and confusion.
132
Courts had almost no role enforcing the British and colonial customary constitutions,
which recognized nothing like judicial review, an idea that appeared only in the early 1780s.
See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 18-24.
133
As I explained at length in The People Themselves, although a handful of sophisticated
lawyers developed a doctrine of judicial review in the 1780s, the practice had not yet achieved
widespread notice or approbation when the Constitution was written and ratified. The vast
majority of Americans, including most politicians and political leaders, had never encountered
judicial review, and most of the few who had encountered it seem to have been opposed. See
id. at 39-92. During ratification, the need for judicial independence was discussed constantly,
but almost always in connection with the ordinary administration of justice. For just a few of
countless examples that could be cited, see A Federal Republican: A Review of the Constitution
(Nov. 28, 1787), in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
255, 267-68 (John P. Kaminksi & Merrill Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY]; Federal Farmer: An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican (May 2, 1788),
in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 265, 335; Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard
Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 178, 181; Letter from Richard
Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, PETERSBURG VA. GAZETTE (Dec. 6, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra, at 364, 371; PA. GAZETTE (Sept. 26, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at
253; West-Chester Farmer: To the Citizens of America (June 8, 1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra, at 129. Lawyers and historians today have inflated the importance of judicial review at
the founding by focusing intensely on a handful of remarks that appear significant only in
retrospect, failing to note how these comments went unnoticed and were practically
unnoticeable in the context of the actual debate. The attention lavished on Brutus’s three
essays on the judiciary and on Hamilton’s Federalist 78 illustrate this pathology. The exchange
between these two essayists is quite sophisticated, and it makes for great reading. But Brutus’s
essays were reprinted nowhere and were essentially invisible, while Federalist 78 was
published only in book form too late to influence any ratifying convention except (possibly)
that of New York (where the question of judicial review never came up). KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 81 & nn.43-45. Writing in 1804, Alexander Contee Hanson
accurately noted that “the Federalist was not completed until almost every state in the Union
had decided on the constitution; and therefore, be its excellence what it may, it could have had
little weight in recommending the constitution.” Editors’ Note to Aristedes: Remarks on the
130
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that the judicial department “merits every care. Its efficacy [from being
independent] is Demonstrated in G. Brittain where it maintains private
Right against all the corruptions of the two other departments & gives a
reputation to the whole Government which it is not in itself entitled to.”134
Madison wrote this letter to Wallace in 1785. He did not mention
judicial review, though he was already familiar with the doctrine, which
had just recently begun to emerge in the states. Indeed, one of the earliest
discussions of this newfangled idea arose in a Virginia case, Commonwealth
v. Caton,135 decided in 1782. The case achieved a degree of notoriety in the
state and was quite controversial, though only two of eight judges argued
that courts could review legislation.136 But letters and editorials in the
newspapers fiercely debated what some referred to as “[t]he great
constitutional question,”137 and James Monroe can be found telling Madison
as late as 1788 that the Virginia legislature had avoided discussing judicial
review as something “calculated to create heats & animosities that will
produce harm.”138
Though controversial at first, the idea continued to gain support, slowly
in the beginning, then more rapidly after the Constitution was ratified and
went into effect.139 A variety of factors help to explain this acceptance, but
in part it was simply that the argument for review in its original, modest
guise was persuasive and hard to ignore. If the Constitution was supreme
law, as everyone agreed that it was, then legislative acts contravening its
terms were ultra vires and void: not law at all. Judges before whom such
acts were brought in the course of ordinary litigation could not just ignore
this fact. To do so would be to ignore a direct command from “the people”
and abet another branch’s violation of the people’s expressed will. The
Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra, at 517, 521. Despite
this, commentators continue to make the same mistake of treating arguments that were
marginal as if they were dominant or representative.
134
Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 14, at 350.
135
Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782).
136
See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial Review, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 491, 500-40 (1995). George Wythe and James Mercer wrote in support; Peter
Lyons was opposed and five others were undecided or unwilling to address a question that
was unnecessary to decide the merits.
137
See Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), in 5 PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 14, at 260-61 (describing the resolution of “[t]he great constitutional
question, as it was called in our papers”); Treanor, supra note 136, at 504-05.
138
Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (Nov. 22, 1788), in 1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MONROE 196 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., 1898).
139
This paragraph simplifies what was, in fact, a quite complicated set of developments.
These are elaborated in detail in KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 35-65.
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principle of popular sovereignty, the foundation on which the Constitution
and government were supposed to rest, demanded that courts treat such
laws as the nullities they were by refusing to enforce them.
Madison was of course willing to allow this much, and he
acknowledged during the 1789 debate over the President’s removal power
that “in the ordinary course of government . . . the exposition of the laws
and constitution devolves upon the judicial.”140 But, he immediately added,
this did not mean that judicial decisions had any special stature or status:
I beg to know, upon what principle it can be contended,
that any one department draws from the constitution
greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of
the powers of the several departments. The constitution is
the charter of the people to the government; it specifies
certain great powers as absolutely granted, and marks out
the departments to exercise them. If the constitutional
boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see
that any one of these independent departments has more
right than another to declare their sentiments on that
point.141
Thomas Jefferson, who embraced the same theory throughout his political
life,142 expressed the idea succinctly: “[E]ach of the three departments has
equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty under the constitution,

140
James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives on the Removal Power of the
President (June 17, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 232, 238.
141
Id.
142
See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 257-94 (1994).
As Mayer explains, Jefferson’s emphasis shifted over time, from an early confidence in the
reliability of courts to a late-life belief that federal judges were an irresponsible “corps of
sappers and miners” working to undermine the Constitution’s careful balancing act. Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 169-70 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898). But these were changes in tone that occurred
within the same departmentalist framework, a framework Jefferson restated on numerous
occasions over the course of three decades. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay
(June 2, 1807), in 4 MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 75 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829) [hereinafter MEMOIRS OF
JEFFERSON]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 4 MEMOIRS, OF
JEFFERSON, supra, at 26-27; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 516, 517-18; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 140-42;
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis Short (Sept. 28, 1820), in THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 160-61.
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without regard to what the others may have decided for themselves under a
similar question.”143
In essence, by recognizing judicial review in this limited form, Madison
was simply adding courts to the process of public deliberation described
above. The judiciary became an additional voice when it came to
constitutional questions: another source of leadership for the community,
and one more potential check in the system of popular constitutionalism
built into our complex government. If a bill passed Congress and was
signed by the President without protest from the states, it was still possible
for the Supreme Court to raise a constitutional objection and ask the public
to reconsider by wielding its power of review as what amounted to a
judicial veto.
This much is straightforward, at least as a conceptual matter. Someone
must have final authority to resolve constitutional conflicts, but in a system
based on popular sovereignty that someone can never be the government or
any part of it. Government agents, whether legislators, executives, or
judges, are just that: agents. When it comes to the Constitution, they are
the regulated, not the regulators. They must do their best to decide what the
Constitution permits, forbids, or requires them to do, but final interpretive
authority always rests with their actual superior, “the people themselves.”
Hence, when Madison, Jefferson, and their supporters proffered what later
scholars have called “departmental” or “concurrent” or “coordinate”
review,144 they were not advocating a process in which no one had final say.
They were defending a system in which the people’s different agents,
including judges, could articulate their varied understandings of the
Constitution in the ordinary course of business and, in effect, present these
to a common superior for judgment. If constitutional conflicts arose, they
would in the end be resolved the only way they could be resolved in a
republican government: they would be decided by the people. As Virginia
Senator Stevens Thomas Mason explained:
Though . . . each department ought to discharge its proper
duties free from the fear of the others, yet I have never
believed that they ought to be independent of the nation
itself. . . . All the departments of a popular Government
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 142, at 140, 142.
144
See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24 (1989);
SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 100-104 (1990); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
228-29 (1994).
143
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must depend, in some degree, on popular opinion. None
can exist without the affections of the people, and if either
be placed in such a situation as to be independent of the
nation, it will soon lose that affection which is essential to
its durable existence.145
Ideally, of course, disputing branches of government would achieve an
accommodation on their own, though Jefferson once observed that “We
have . . . in more than one instance, seen the opinions of different
departments in opposition to each other, & no ill ensue.”146 Still,
accommodation by and among the branches was what all the checking and
balancing that Madison had described in Federalist 51 was supposed to
accomplish. And if no compromise was forthcoming, if different
departments insisted on what Senator John Breckinridge of Kentucky called
“[a] pertinacious adherence . . . to their opinions”, it was obvious who
would decide.147 The issue would be answered, in Madison’s words, by
“the will of the community, to be collected in some mode to be provided by
the constitution, or one dictated by the necessity of the case.”148
***
This way of thinking about the role of courts supports a system of
judicial review, but one with no notion or idea of judicial supremacy.
That’s hardly surprising given what we know of Madison’s thinking.
Assigning courts supremacy over constitutional interpretation would have
been flatly anti-republican, because it would have deprived the community
Stevens Thomas Mason, Speech to Congress, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 59, at 59.
MAYER, supra note 142, at 270. The quoted passage is from Jefferson’s notes for his First
Inaugural Address. He deleted the passage because, in context, it pertained to his plans to
pardon those convicted under the Sedition Act, and this was a politically controversial step
that Jefferson wanted to downplay in the interest of striking a conciliatory tone. See id. at 269;
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 142, at 518.
147
“Although . . . the courts may take upon them to give decisions which impeach the
constitutionality of a law, and thereby, for a time, obstruct its operations,” Breckinridge
explained:
Yet I contend that such a law is not the less obligatory because the organ
through which it is to be executed has refused its aid. A pertinacious
adherence of both departments to their opinions, would soon bring the
question to issue, in whom the sovereign power of legislation resided,
and whose construction of the law-making power should prevail.
11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 59, at 179-80. By “bring the question to issue,” Breckinridge
means, of course that “pertinacious adherence” to conflicting views by different branches
would force the public to decide.
148
James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives on the President’s Removal
Power, (June 17, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra note 14, at 238.
145
146
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of final say over the meaning of their Constitution by giving it to a mere
agent of the people—worse, an agent structured and designed to be as
unaccountable as possible. And that is something Madison could never
accept. The right of the people “to judge whether the [Constitution] has
been dangerously violated,” he wrote in 1800, “must extend to violations by
one delegated authority, as well as by another; by the judiciary, as well as
by the executive, or the legislature.”149
Yet review without supremacy is meaningful only if there is some way
for the people to control judicial interpretations, just as they control
interpretations of the political branches. Which raised an exceedingly
awkward problem, for how are “the people” supposed to repudiate or
overturn decisions of the courts on constitutional questions? When it came
to Congress or the President or the political branches of the states, the forms
of popular control were obvious. The same devices that created
accountability were the tools by which the public registered its agreement
or disagreement and ensured that constitutional disputes were resolved
according to popular opinion, particularly as, over time, these devices
fostered a general culture of responsiveness among elected representatives.
But courts were not accountable in these ways, and they had been selfconsciously constructed to be shielded from precisely these sorts of
pressures. As noted above,150 this was to ensure fair decisions in ordinary
cases of “private Right,” and not because courts were expected to play the
part of final arbiter of constitutional meaning.151 But whatever the reason,
judicial independence was a fact, and it created a dilemma in defining the
courts’ role in a system of popular constitutionalism: how do we secure
accountability for constitutional decisions when courts are independent and
when, given their other responsibilities, we want them to remain so?

James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in MADISON: WRITINGS,
supra note 14, at 608, 613 [hereinafter Madison, Report].
150
See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
151
There was one commentator who tied judicial independence to judicial review:
Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist 78 that, in addition to its usual functions, judicial
independence “is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution” because “the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 524-25 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Although Hamilton was
defending only the modest form of review discussed in the text and had not yet pushed the
argument to the point of judicial supremacy, he was nevertheless out ahead of everyone else in
his reasoning, neither the first nor the last time this would be so. Of course, the importance of
Federalist 78 is entirely retrospective. It played no role in Ratification, as it was published too
late and had too limited a circulation to have influence, and no one else at the time made a
similar argument. See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 80-81; supra note 133.
149
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The opportunity to overturn judicial decisions by constitutional
amendment was not an answer, any more than it would have been an
answer to action by the political branches. No one had ever doubted the
people’s authority to create new constitutional law. But as we have seen,
the accompanying power to declare the meaning of the existing constitution
had also always been held by the community, and it remained central to the
very idea of republicanism. The unquestioned existence of popular
authority to make constitutional law thus did not and could not justify
denying popular authority to control its interpretation, something that
would be true, I think, even had amending the Constitution not become so
difficult as to make its possibility meaningless as a practical matter.
Nor did Americans write provisions for amendment into their
constitutions with any idea that, in doing so, they were supplanting popular
authority to interpret. Rather, as explained in The People Themselves,152
formal amendment processes were developed to address problems that
could not be solved by interpretation. Americans were aware that their
constitutions incorporated numerous untried innovations, and for all their
eagerness and enthusiasm, they expected some of these to fail. Problems
that arose because of ambiguity or uncertainty in the text could be resolved
by a Madisonian process of public deliberation and interpretation—the
same sort of process that had resolved constitutional conflicts throughout
British and colonial history and that Madison would later say had settled
the constitutionality of a federally-chartered bank several years before John
Marshall addressed the issue.153 But what about constitutional provisions
that were unambiguous, but turned out to be mistakes? What about
provisions that worked at the beginning, but became obsolete or
dysfunctional over time? Popular constitutionalism was not a blank check
for the public to ignore the law it had made. If the Constitution was clear, it
had to be changed, not interpreted.
Yet traditional popular means for changing a constitution were difficult
at best, and experience taught that most often change was accompanied by
violence and civil unrest. So Americans chose to address the problem by
creating something new, in George Mason’s words, “an easy, regular and
Constitutional way” to make revisions.154 The amendment device could
also be used to cure ambiguities, but this was neither its motivation nor its
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 51-54.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); James Madison, Veto Message
(Jan. 30, 1815), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 555
(1900).
154
Notes of James Madison (June 6, 1787), reprinted in 1 FARRAND, supra note 14, at 202-03
(remarks of George Mason).
152
153
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main purpose (which may be why supporters of judicial authority did not
at the time rely on its availability for support). The power to amend, in any
event, was situated in a legal and intellectual framework in which
interpretive authority remained where it had always been: with the people
at large.
Which brings us back to the same quandary: if judges are not elected
and their salaries are protected, and we give them power to obstruct actions
by the other branches on constitutional grounds, how do we retain popular
control over the Constitution? At this point, I want to digress briefly to
consider how the major powers of modern Europe have handled the
problem. Germany, France, Italy, and Spain (not to mention Russia and the
nations of Eastern Europe) have all adopted new constitutions since World
War II. As such, they were able to design their governments with our
experience in mind, and it has not been missed that all chose for the first
time to embrace strong doctrines of judicial review. Less noticed is how
these nations structured their judiciaries differently from ours precisely to
enable their courts to act while preserving an adequate degree of popular
control.
To begin with, the nations of Western Europe delegated constitutional
adjudication to special courts, which were set apart from the regular legal
system in recognition that the constitution is not just another species of
ordinary law and that constitutional litigation is not just another species of
litigation.155 The sole function of these courts is to review constitutional
questions. They do not address other matters or issue judgments over
whole cases, thus disentangling constitutional review from more
conventional legal matters. By this means, independence in constitutional
cases could be (and has been) structured and balanced differently than in
ordinary cases, enabling the Europeans to take the inherent political nature
of constitutional law into account without compromising the need to
exclude politics from ordinary litigation.
Given the high political station occupied by constitutional courts,
various provisions were then made to ensure an appropriate level of
political responsiveness while still securing the courts’ ability to act as an
independent counterweight.
Once on the bench, the judges are
independent. But unlike in other European courts, appointment is political
rather than bureaucratic. More important, getting appointed typically
See Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:
THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD, 38, 40-59 (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of
the Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183 (1942).
155
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requires a supermajority in one or both houses of the legislature, thus
guaranteeing that constitutional courts have a mainstream ideology, and the
judges serve terms that are limited and staggered to ensure that this
remains so through regular turnover.156 Finally, the constitutions
themselves were made more easily amendable than ours.
The combined effect of these structural innovations has been to relieve
the pressure a doctrine of supremacy creates, by reducing the likelihood of
serious breaches between the constitutional court and the other branches of
government and by making political correctives easier to implement when
breaches occur. Partly as a result, constitutional courts in Europe have
managed successfully to mimic or even exceed American activism without
the same controversy, though recent developments suggest that European
judges, too, may be approaching the limits of their authority.157
Structural precautions like these are not found in the United States
Constitution because when our Founding Fathers wrote it no one had yet
imagined anything even remotely like modern judicial supremacy. Judicial
review was first conceived in this country in the context of ordinary
litigation, and it matured as an aspect of the normal legal system,
intermingling constitutional decisions with other legal questions and
conflating constitutional and ordinary law. This meant, among other
things, that the robust protection given American judges in ordinary cases,
where popular control can be maintained through regular politics, ended
up similarly protecting judges from popular control in constitutional cases.
As judicial power expanded and its potential and political importance
became clear, supporters and defenders of popular constitutionalism
discovered a need to compensate for this mistake in our constitutional
design. With no models or prior experience to work from, they and their
successors handled the problem of courts as they handled so many other
unanticipated problems: by innovating and jerry-rigging a system of
political solutions on the fly, as problems arose.

See the country-by-country surveys in VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 489-91 (1999); ALEC STONE SWEET, Constitutional Adjudication and
Parliamentary Democracy, in GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE
tbl.2.3 (2000).
157
The most obvious example is the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
concerning the display of a crucifix in the classroom, 93 BVerfGE 1 (1995), which Donald
Kommers reports has “tarnished the court’s reputation in the eyes of many Germans and
raised questions . . . about the legitimacy of judicial review,” questions that are common in the
United States but until now have been “a rare occurrence in Germany.” DONALD KOMMERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY xiv (2d ed. 1997).
Similar concerns are beginning to percolate in other countries as well.
156
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The solutions they crafted are familiar.158 Thomas Jefferson (with full
support from his Secretary of State James Madison) abolished a lower court,
revised Supreme Court procedures, threatened to ignore the Court’s
mandates, and briefly pursued a strategy of impeaching judges. Andrew
Jackson followed Jefferson in threatening to ignore judgments, while
Lincoln actually did so (and on more than one occasion). Congresses before
and after the Civil War manipulated the Court’s size, played with its
budget, and stripped it of jurisdiction in controversial areas. Theodore
Roosevelt advocated recalling both errant judges and faulty opinions, while
his cousin Franklin made a famously brazen effort to pack the bench (one
that would almost certainly have succeeded had the Court not backed down
first).
***
I will not undertake in this Lecture to examine how these or similar
devices might work today. As the strong reactions of many reviewers of
The People Themselves make clear, this is a controversial subject, and it
requires more depth and detail than the present occasion allows. Nor do I
mean to reduce popular constitutionalism to these few blunt tools. As
others have pointed out, there are multiple avenues by which popular will
finds its expression in courts.159 There do, however, need to be mechanisms
to make clear and to operationalize where ultimate authority lies. I
continue to believe that we need these devices, or something that can serve
their function, if we are to restore the robust sense of popular
constitutionalism on which this nation was founded and that remains its
best and most distinctive contribution to government and democratic
theory. All this, however, is the subject for a second book. For now, then,
let me close with a few observations meant to lay some of the groundwork
for further investigation.
What I have mainly attempted to accomplish here is to recover
Madison’s theory of deliberative democracy and restore to modern
understanding its fundamental popular and democratic character. That
theory includes a role for courts, but a modest one, consistent with
Madison’s lifelong commitment to securing the community’s active and
actual control over the interpretation (as well as the making) of
For a useful survey, see CHARLES GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE (2006).
See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power: Policentric Interpretations of the Family Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003);
Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case
of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
158
159
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constitutional law. Madison sought to achieve this control through a
system of “departmentalism,” in which different departments of
government were first made dependent on the people and interdependent
on each other, and then given authority to pursue and act on their own best
understanding of the Constitution. By this means, Madison sought to
generate what amounted to a competition of understandings among
political officials that, by forcing the leadership class to appeal to the
community for support, would simultaneously inform public opinion and
secure its sovereignty.
There is room for a doctrine of judicial review in Madison’s approach,
but not for anything resembling judicial supremacy. The judiciary, too,
must be subject to community discipline via popular reactions to challenges
from the other departments, which must then in turn possess viable means
to gainsay judicial interpretations. In the past, this meant political pressure
backed ultimately by the possibility of such things as ignoring mandates,
budget cutting, jurisdiction stripping, court packing, and the like. And for
myself, I would prefer these sorts of devices to nothing. But whatever the
appropriate means might be, the opportunity to ask the Justices to reverse
themselves, to make occasional appointments, and to amend the
Constitution are not enough.

Departmentalism is not the same as anarchy. It does not mean, for
instance, that every government official or employee is free to act according
to his or her own understanding of the Constitution. Quite the contrary, a
departmental approach works only if there is enforced discipline within the
respective branches. The President must be able to remove cabinet officers
or other subordinates who refuse to follow executive policy, just as lower
courts must respect and follow Supreme Court precedents whatever a
judge’s individual views. Departmentalism is a process for channeling
different positions to the public through functional agencies, not a free for
all.
Even this more restrained understanding seems to baffle modern
commentators, who see departmentalism as a system in which no one has
final say and so a formula for continual conflict and confusion.160 From a
160
I discussed different commentators’ puzzlement with departmentalism and explained
how Madison’s version of it differed in KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 1, at 10607. Some reviewers of the book somehow missed this discussion and simply repeated the same
criticisms of the theory. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1609-15 (2005) (book review).
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theoretical or conceptual standpoint, this reaction reveals the extent to
which we have lost touch with the very idea of popular constitutionalism.
For what underlies the commentators’ skepticism is an unstated assumption
not just that someone must have final authority to resolve routine
constitutional conflicts, but that this someone can only be a governmental
agency. It misses the central principle of popular constitutionalism, which
is that final interpretive authority can and must rest with the people
themselves.
From a practical standpoint, equating departmentalism with chaos
misses the extent to which our system truly is responsive. On the one hand,
different branches of government may well disagree for a time and, as
Jefferson observed, “no ill ensue.”161 In fact, this happens constantly even
with judicial supremacy, as the Supreme Court often takes years to get
around to addressing issues and just as often fails to settle them clearly. On
the other hand, once public sentiment has begun to swing decisively in a
particular direction, the political branches of government will all invariably
follow, whatever the personal preferences of their members. (Lest you
doubt it, consider the effort to remove President Clinton. As determined
and disciplined as the Republicans were, and American political parties
have seldom been this determined or disciplined, public antipathy toward
impeachment kept them from even coming close to convicting. Other
examples abound, too.) On any issue that captures the public’s attention,
where the majority goes is where government policy will go. Madison’s
genius was in conceptualizing and helping to create a realistic process for
making this fact operational by “contriving the interior structure of the
government” to foster debate, educate the public, register its responses, and
translate these responses into action. It may sometimes be slow and not
very pretty, but it works.162
One way in which the process may seem ugly is in how little is
specified. There are no easy rules of recognition to identify how a
constitutional issue arises, much less how it gets resolved. There are not
See MAYER, supra note 142, at 270.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 17, at 320. And to the extent it no longer works, the
answer must be to fix it, not to surrender power to the least democratic institution in our
government. No doubt politics today is broken in a number of respects. The belief that
elections would sift out “the purest and noblest characters” in society was unrealistic even in
Madison’s day, see Madison, Vices of the Political System, supra note 99, at 357, but political
leadership has probably never been worse than now. The sad state of our media is a problem,
as is the dissolution of functional political parties and much of the rest of civil society. But
these problems are addressable, and it’s our responsibility to address them. If we do, we will
not need to give the Supreme Court so much authority; if we do not, we might need to give up
on the idea of functional democracy more broadly.
161
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even clear rules about how one knows if something is a constitutional issue.
Instead, such matters are left to the free play of interbranch and
intergovernmental politics. Actors in any institution can try to turn
something into a constitutional question, and the only measure of their
success or failure is how other political actors and the public respond. Nor
is the ability to initiate a debate limited to formal institutions of
government. Social movements, different parts of civil society, even
individuals may equally launch a campaign based on a novel reading of the
Constitution, with the test of validity being only whether they can persuade
enough others to embrace or adopt their position. In reality, of course, the
process is nowhere near as open as this might suggest. Not every crazy
idea stands an equal chance of success, because political culture and
tradition naturally limit what kinds of arguments that have appeal in public
discourse, which ensures a great deal of consistency over time. Change still
tends to be incremental and continuous.
The system remains departmental in that, in the final analysis, the proof
of who has prevailed will necessarily be seen in what public agents do (or
stop doing). There will be some innovation in government—a decision, an
administrative practice, a law, a new structure—that either succeeds or fails,
and its success or failure marks a conflict’s resolution. But how and when
that resolution takes place, or by which institution it is determined, can
change and may be impossible to predict. Different branches or different
levels of government can hold sway at different times, and power moves
constantly about. This is the sense in which popular constitutionalism is
like politics. The public arguments may be different, may be about the
meaning of text or precedent and not just about the right thing to do, but
the process by which these arguments are decided is as undefined and
unspecified as anything else that gets decided in the hurly burly of politics
and public debate.
That can be disconcerting, especially to lawyers, who like identifiable
rules of procedure and recognition and have gotten used to thinking of the
Constitution as a matter for ordinary judicial process. It should not be. In
the end, the view that prevails (and I mean this with respect to both
whether something is a constitutional issue and how it should be decided)
is the view that always prevails, which is to say the view of whoever we
decide has final interpretive authority. The difference is that, unlike judicial
supremacy, which vests that authority in the Supreme Court, a system of
popular constitutionalism vests it in “the people themselves.”
Even this is an exaggeration. On most constitutional issues, no one
inside or outside government will be able to rouse sufficient public ire to
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undo the actions of whichever branch speaks last. And as Madison often
observed, as a practical matter this tends to be the judiciary.163 We have
seen his point demonstrated throughout history, just as we see it today.
Efforts to stir opposition to the Supreme Court may be frequent, and
extreme views certainly seem to appear with regularity. Such is the effect of
free speech. But the anxiety bordering on panic that this opposition arouses
is unnecessary. Because politicians who choose to take on the Court must
still be able to rally enough support to get action, and that turns out to be
extremely difficult. Just ask Franklin Roosevelt. Or Tom DeLay. Even
Jefferson hesitated before confronting the Marshall Court, though
eventually the Federalist bench pushed him too far.164 It takes a proverbial
long train of abuses—a persistent course of provocative and unpopular
action by the Justices, usually over a sustained period—before a large
enough majority of the public will allow responsive measures, and even
then an enormous amount of political energy must be expended to produce
actual legislative or executive countermeasures. The American people, it
turns out, are fully capable of grasping the benefits of having a strong
judiciary, even when they disagree with particular decisions. And if they
forget, there are always political leaders out there to remind them. It is no
coincidence that only very popular presidents have managed successfully to
confront the Court, and only after extraordinary provocation. The judiciary
is a quite robust political institution, more like an 800-pound gorilla than
the 90-pound weakling Hamilton fretted about in Federalist 78. But its
strength or weakness should be a product of its ability to make decisions
that persuade the public, unaided by an artificial doctrine designed to
disarm the other branches and lull the public into passivity.
Put another way, the judiciary does not need supremacy to play its role
in a system of separation of powers. Our history makes this abundantly
clear, for the Court has been an active and important institution from early
on, whereas the idea of supremacy has found broad acceptance only in the
past generation or two. As social scientists have long understood, a
reasonably prudent Court can establish and sustain a high degree of

163
Madison recognized this point on numerous occasions during more than forty years of
(1834), in 4 LETTERS
thinking about courts. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Mr.
OF MADISON, supra note 93, at 349-50; Madison, Observations of Jefferson’s Draft, supra note 14, at
315; Madison, Report, supra note 149, at 613-14.
164
See NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS IN POWER: PARTY
OPERATIONS, 1801-1809, at 12-70 (1963); RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS
AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 44 (1971); KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note
1, at 117-19; DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 17-28, 69-89
(1970); James O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219, 238, 242 (1992).
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authority even without formal support from a doctrine of supremacy.165
The reasons were identified by Madison as far back as 1834. Even within a
departmental framework, Madison speculated:
[T]he Judicial department most familiarizes itself to the
public attention as the expositor, by the order of its
functions in relation to the other departments; and attracts
most the public confidence by the composition of the
tribunal. . . . [T]he public deference to and confidence in
the judgment of the body are peculiarly inspired by the
qualities implied in its members; by the gravity and
deliberation of their proceedings; and by the advantage
their plurality gives them over the unity of the Executive
department, and their fewness over the multitudinous
composition of the Legislative department.166
It does not follow that nothing is at stake in the choice between a system
of judicial supremacy and one based on departmental construction. In the
latter system, the authority of judicial decisions formally and explicitly
depends on reactions from the other branches and, through them, from the
public. This, in turn, can make an enormous difference in how the Justices
behave. There may be political obstacles to punishing the Court that make
it possible, even without judicial supremacy, for the Justices to have their
way most of the time. But the obstacles are smaller: smaller by precisely
the weight conferred on Supreme Court decisions by the doctrine of judicial
supremacy, which, if that doctrine is widely accepted, can be considerable.
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See David Adamny & Joel Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a National
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A Panel Study, 43 J. POL. 24 (1981).
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93, at 349-50. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme
Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 535 (2003).
When courts become salient, people become exposed to the symbolic
trappings of judicial power—‘the marble temple, the high bench, the
purple curtain, the black robes’. . . . Thus, the effect of displeasure with a
particular court decision may be muted by contact with these legitimating
symbols. To know courts is indeed to love them . . . .
Id.
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The result of removing this weight is not more conflict. Indeed, a great
irony of making clear that we can and should discipline an overreaching
Court is that it will then almost never be necessary to do so. Rather than
more or constant conflict, we will instead see a different equilibrium
emerge, as a risk-averse and potentially vulnerable Court adjusts its
behavior to greater sensitivity on the part of political leadership in the other
branches. The practical likelihood of being overturned may be small, but
the sense of responsibility thus engendered, together with a natural desire
to avoid controversy and protect the institution of the Court, would
inevitably change the dynamics of decision-making. It is this, in fact, that
explains how the Supreme Court has historically husbanded its authority
even without judicial supremacy, as well as why crises occurred only when
an overconfident Court claiming to be supreme paid too little mind to the
public’s view of things.167
***
At the end of Federalist 10, Madison exults in what he has accomplished.
By enlarging the sphere of the republic, he boasts, “we behold a Republican
remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government.”168
Political theorists and constitutional scholars have focused too much on
Madison’s concern for the diseases incident to republican government
without paying adequate attention to the first “republican” in that sentence.
Certainly Madison was concerned about the dangers of popular
government and “the excess of democracy.”169 But not just any remedy
would do. The remedy had to be a republican remedy, a remedy consistent
with the popular constitutionalism that was the fundamental premise of the
Revolution and of Madison’s own life and philosophy. And he found his
remedy, too, one that is, or rather could be made, as relevant and useful
today as it was at our nation’s inception.
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